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THE ENFORCERS & THE GREAT RECESSION 
Mark Tottent 
No one played a more vital role responding to the worst economic crisis 
since the Great Depression than a small band of state attorneys general 
(AGs). Yet this story has never been told nor its implications considered. 
For more than a decade these AGs brought enforcement actions across the 
residential mortgage lending industry, reaching the origination, servicing, 
and securitization processes. From roughly 2000 to 2008, they targeted 
several of the largest subprime lenders for predatory and discriminatory 
lending. And they moved in the face of federal inaction-at times, even 
opposition. With the economic crisis everywhere visible by early 2009, they 
turned toward abuses in mortgage servicing and securitization. While they 
often collaborated with their federal counterparts during this time period, 
these AGs continued to lead and shape the enforcement agenda. 
This narrative demonstrates that states are integral to the task of 
consumer financial protection. Congress was right to empower states in the 
Dodd-Frank Act of 2010 by scaling back preemption and giving the AGs 
concurrent enforcement powers. The AGs not only serve as a stopgap when 
federal regulators fail to act, but they also alter the quality of enforcement 
in positive ways not replicated by even engaged federal regulators. The 
marks of AG enforcement include information advantages, agility, a 
remedial focus, resistance to capture, and entrepreneurialism. Moreover, 
these events also suggest a new enforcement model in the area of consumer 
protection that may sometimes prove more efficient than earlier 
approaches: the multigovernment, multiagency action. And while these 
observations concern consumer financial protection in the first instance, 
they also have implications for ongoing conversations about federalism and 
enforcement. 
t Associate Professor of Law, Michigan State University College of Law. Several people 
provided helpful feedback during this project. Thanks to Chris Barry-Smith, James Chen, Prentiss 
Cox, Kathleen Engel, Catherine Grosso, Joan Howarth, Patrick Madigan, Sean Pager, Jennifer 
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INTRODUCTION 
No one played a more vital role responding to the worst economic 
crisis since the Great Depression than a small band of state attorneys 
general. In a different day they might have played a significant, yet 
secondary role. Federal regulators, vested with powers more broad and 
refined, might have prevented, or at least curtailed, the worst abuses by 
the largest offenders, whose activities spanned the nation. But as the 
crisis approached the feds stood silent. And at times, they even opposed 
the states that stepped into the breach. 
My claim is that before, during, and even after the Great Recession, 
a handful of state attorneys general (AGs) led the way on enforcement. 
Their response was evolving, but comprehensive. They demonstrated 
remarkable collaboration and forged broad enforcement coalitions. 
Minimally, these states functioned as a stopgap in our federalist system. 
But they were not just a second line of defense. Even after the feds began 
exercising their powers, the states were a critical force on the front lines 
and positively shaped the quality of enforcement in ways not replicated 
by their federal counterparts. Moreover, the AGs' later partnership with 
the feds created a new model for state-federal collaboration. 
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No one has told this story from beginning to end, starting with 
several enforcement actions against predatory lenders that began in the 
late 1990s and finishing with more recent actions against the institutions 
that financed the subprime enterprise. This narrative matters for several 
reasons. For most of their existence, AGs have flown below the scholarly 
and popular radar. That obscurity briefly lifted in 1998 with the 
staggering $206 billion tobacco settlement.! A burst of scholarship 
ensued, much of it critical of the terms and regulatory effects of the deal, 
as well as the actors behind it.2 This assessment framed the discussion 
moving forward. In their response to the subprime mortgage crisis, the 
AGs have arguably exerted more influence than any other time in 
modern history. This performance requires rethinking the role of the 
states' chief legal officers. 
This narrative also supports the case for empowered states to 
protect consumers in the financial marketplace. Acting alone or in 
concert with federal regulators, the AGs played an indispensable role. In 
every major case the AGs brought related to the Great Recession, they 
drew on their state consumer protection acts. Moreover, in the Dodd-
Frank Act of 2010, Congress empowered states with a double blessing: 
scaled-back federal preemption and new concurrent enforcement 
powers. The story I tell is in part justification for this dual enforcement 
regime and for strong state consumer protection laws. In addition, the 
story shines light on the means whereby the states might collaborate 
with their federal counterparts and craft remedies that avoid the worst 
costs of "regulation by litigation." And while my focus is consumer 
financial protection, this story also has implications for larger 
conversations about federalism and enforcement. 
In telling this story, I stay within certain margins. My time frame is 
roughly 2000-2014 and focuses on a few states3 and their attorneys 
general that led the way: California, Illinois, Iowa, Massachusetts, and 
New York. Two of these states had the same AG throughout nearly the 
1 Master Settlement Agreement Related Information, NAT'L Ass'N ATT'Ys GEN., 
http:/ /www.naag.org/naag/ about_naag/naag-center-for- tobacco-and -public-health/master-
settlement-agreement.php (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
2 See, e.g., Michael DeBow, The State Tobacco Litigation and the Separation of Powers in State 
Governments: Repairing the Damage, 31 SETON HALL L. REv. 563 (2001); Michael I. Krauss, 
Regulation Masquerading as Judgment: Chaos Masquerading as Tort Law, 71 MISS. L.J. 631 (2001); 
Jason Lynch, Note, Federalism, Separation of Powers, and the Role of State Attorneys General in 
Multistate Litigation, 101 COLUM. L. REv. 1998 (2001). 
3 In addition to states, some cities took steps to combat predatory lending, but were stymied 
in part because they often failed to establish standing. See Kathleen C. Engel, Do Cities Have 
Standing? Redressing the Externalities of Predatory Lending, 38 CONN. L. REv. 355 (2006); 
Kathleen C. Engel, The State of Play in City Claims Against Financial Firms, 40 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. CITY SQUARE 82 (2014); Jonathan L. Entin & Shadya Y. Yazback, City Governments and 
Predatory Lending, 34 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 757 (2007); Jonathan L. Entin, City Governments and 
Predatory Lending Revisited, 40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. CITY SQUARE 108 (2014). 
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entire story: Illinois (Lisa Madigan, 2003-present); 4 and Iowa (Tom 
Miller, 1979-1990, 1994-present).s The other states had multiple AGs: 
California (Bill Lockyer, 1999-2007; Jerry Brown, 2007-2011; Kamala 
Harris, 2011-present);6 Massachusetts (Tom Reilly, 1999-2007; Martha 
Coakley, 2007-2014);7 and New York (Eliot Spitzer, 1999-2006; Andrew 
Cuomo, 2007-2010; and Eric Schneiderman, 2011-present). 8 
Collectively, I refer to these officials as the "Enforcers." Others could 
join this list, including important leaders such as North Carolina 
Attorney General Roy Cooper (2001-present), Washington Attorney 
General Rob McKenna (2005-2013), and Colorado Attorney General 
John Suthers (2005-present).9 Although I focus on the elected AGs, of 
course others were critical. A core group of career lawyers within 
attorneys general offices collaborated on multiple cases. 10 Moreover, 
state banking regulators were also important, as they had resources and 
jurisdictional powers that some AGs lacked.u 
In Part I, "The Backstory," I provide a brief overview of the 
mortgage lending system and its three primary components: 
origination, servicing, and securitization. I then identify several threats 
that emerged within this system. Having set the scene, I turn in Part II 
to the "Story of the Enforcers," roughly dividing the narrative into two 
acts. The first Act covers the years 2000-2008, leading up to the Great 
Recession. Acting alone, the AGs brought a series of actions focused on 
harms arising out of the loan origination process: namely, predatory and 
discriminatory lending. The second Act covers the years 2009-2014, 
where the Enforcers were resolving the earlier cases, but turning their 
attention to harms arising out of the servicing and securitization 
processes. In Part III, "What the Story Tells Us," I consider both why 
4 See ILL. ATT'Y GEN., http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 20 15). 
s See IOWA ATT'Y GEN., https:/ /www.iowaattorneygeneral.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
6 See CAL. ATT'Y GEN., http://oag.ca.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
7 See MASS. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.mass.gov/ago (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
8 See N.Y. ATT'Y GEN., http://www.ag.ny.gov (last visited Apr. 22, 2015). 
9 Although not an exhaustive list, other attorneys general that played an important role 
included Connecticut Attorneys General Richard Blumenthal ( 1991-2011) and George Jepsen 
(2011-present); Delaware Attorney General Joseph "Beau" Eiden III (2007-present); Minnesota 
Attorney General Mike Hatch (1999-2007); and Ohio Attorney General Richard Cordray (2009-
2011). 
10 A few examples of career lawyers within AGs' offices include Chris Barry-Smith (former 
Assistant Attorney General and now Deputy Attorney General, Massachusetts Attorney General's 
Office, 1997-1999, 2002-present); Prentiss Cox (Manager, Consumer Enforcement Division, 
Minnesota Attorney General's Office, 2001-2005); Deborah Hagan (Chief, Consumer Protection 
Division, Illinois Attorney General's Office, 2004-present); David Huey (Senior Assistant 
Attorney General, Washington Attorney General's Office, 2001-present); Tom James (Senior 
Assistant Attorney General, Illinois Attorney General's Office, 1988-present); Kathleen Keest 
(Assistant Attorney General, Iowa Attorney General's Office, 1996-2004); Patrick Madigan 
(Assistant Attorney General, Iowa Attorney General's Office, 2004-present); and Tam Ormison 
(Deputy Attorney General, Iowa Attorney General's Office, 1997-present). 
11 See infra note 72. 
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states matter for consumer financial protection and the means whereby 
the state and federal governments might collaborate. And then in Part 
IV, "The Rest of the Story," I sketch an agenda for empirical research to 
further understand the events of this narrative and its normative 
lessons. 
I. THE BACKSTORY 
This story is in some sense but a chapter in the larger story about 
the Great Recession: its causes, effects, and the responses to the crisis. 
That tale has been told elsewhere, new versions continue to appear, and 
debates about the storyline persist.Iz This larger story is beyond the 
scope of my narrative and parts of that story stray far from the space 
occupied by AGs. (They have little impact on, say, setting the federal 
funds rate or the level of foreign currency reserves in China.) 
Nonetheless, to understand the AGs' role we need to review one of the 
central themes in that larger story: the residential mortgage lending 
system and the failures that arose within that system. 
A. The Mortgage Lending System 
Although the crisis eventually touched every area of the economy, 
it began in the financial sector, and in particular within the system of 
residential mortgage lending. This system has three primary 
components: origination, servicing, and securitization. 
1. Origination. Loan origination involves a borrower applying for a 
loan and a lender processing that application. Lenders are of two kinds: 
depositories and nondepositories (often referred to as "nonbank 
mortgage lenders").l3 Both types played a significant role in the run-up 
to the economic crisis. Depository institutions-that is, institutions that 
take deposits-are the traditional lenders and include both banks and 
12 See, e.g., NAT'L COMM'N ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. & ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S., THE 
FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT (2011) [hereinafter FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT], 
available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-FCIC/pdf/GPO-FCIC.pdf; THE AMERICAN 
MORTGAGE SYSTEM: CRISIS AND REFORM (Susan M. Wachter & Marvin M. Smith eds., 2011); 
ALAN S. BLINDER, AFTER THE MUSIC STOPPED: THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, THE RESPONSE, AND THE 
WORK AHEAD (2013); KATHLEEN C. ENGEL & PATRICIA A. MCCOY, THE SUBPRIME VIRUS: 
RECKLESS CREDIT, REGULATORY FAILURE, AND NEXT STEPS (2011); JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: 
AMERICA, FREE MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010); WHAT CAUSED 
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS (Jeffrey Friedman ed., 2011); Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, 
Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 1177 (2012); Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, Opinion, 
The Clinton-Era Roots of the Financial Crisis, WALL ST. J., Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB 1000142412 78873234 77 604579000571334113350. 
13 ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 151-52. 
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thrifts (often called "savings associations" or "savings and loans" 
institutions). In the American dual banking system, these depositories 
apply for either a state or federal charter,14 All banks and thrifts have a 
federal regulator, and state depositories also have a state regulator. 
Non bank mortgage lenders do not take deposits and exist either as 
freestanding corporations or affiliates of a state or federal depository. 
The rise of securitization, briefly discussed below, gave rise to the 
proliferation of nonbank lenders because they could access capital on 
the market. Prior to the 2010 reforms, the states were the primary 
regulators of independent nonbank lenders, although the Federal Trade 
Commission (FTC) had power to address unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices. Various federal agencies regulated nonbank lenders connected 
to a federal depository. 
For decades, prime lending financed American home sales: a 20% 
down payment on the purchase price, repaid over 30 years at a fixed-
interest rate by a borrower whose capacity to make repayments was 
documented and secured by the asset.1s This gold-standard brought 
benefits for both sides-with modest savings the otherwise capital-poor 
borrower could purchase a home, while the lender could receive a 
reasonable return on investment protected by the down payment should 
the homeowner default in the midst of a dip in the housing market. 
Variations on the traditional mortgage existed-and government 
subsidies to grow the ranks of homeowners allowed lenders in certain 
circumstances to lower the down payment-but prime lending 
remained the industry's core.16 
Beginning in the early 1990s, however, lenders began to 
aggressively market a different kind of financial product, which had 
existed in limited fashion for several years: the subprime mortgage, as 
well as Alt-A mortgages,!? In theory, both products were aimed at 
persons who otherwise did not qualify for prime lending. In fact, many 
unscrupulous lenders pushed these products on people who otherwise 
would qualify for prime lending. This population posed a higher risk of 
default. The cost of bearing this risk was baked into the loan in the form 
of higher fees and a higher interest rate. As conceived, subprime 
mortgages targeted borrowers who posed the most risk-typically 
persons with poor credit histories and who lacked the savings to make a 
down payment. Alt-A mortgages often targeted a population who posed 
14 See generally id. at 151-53; 1 DONALD RESSEGUIE, BANKING LAW§ 1.04 (2015). 
15 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 15. 
16 See Baher Azmy, Squaring the Predatory Lending Circle: A Case for States as Laboratories of 
Experimentation, 57 FLA. L. REv. 295, 307 (2005). 
17 For an account of these developments, see FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 
12, at 67-80; ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 15-42; Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dark Side of 
Universal Banking: Financial Conglomerates and the Origins of the Subprime Financial Crisis, 41 
CONN. L. REV. 963, 1015-16 (2009). 
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less risk, but still had minor credit issues or otherwise were unable or 
unwilling to document their assets or income.1s 
In time the industry skyrocketed. In 1995 subprime lending 
accounted for $65 billion in loans and by 2006 it accounted for $600 
billion and 24% of all mortgage originations.19 Likewise, Alt-A loans 
went from $60 billion in 2001 to $400 billion in 2006. 20 At the same 
time, the players in the industry changed. 21 Larger financial 
institutions-commercial banks, investment banks, and others-saw the 
profit realized in subprime lending and scooped up the smaller players 
that appeared in the early 1990s.zz And a few firms that were once small 
and local, such as Ameriquest and Countrywide, now spread across the 
nation. As we will see, these firms increasingly used predatory tactics to 
feed an insatiable mortgage machine. 
2. Servicing. Loan servicing-the second component of the 
residential mortgage lending system-involves two primary functions: 
the administration of loan repayments and the handling of 
delinquencies. 23 The repayment process includes sending statements, 
collecting payments, handling escrow accounts, tracking account 
balances, reporting to credit bureaus, and applying shifting interest rates 
in the case of adjustable rate mortgages.z4 The delinquency process 
includes both loan modifications (i.e., loan restructuring or short sales) 
and foreclosures.zs In an earlier day, the originator and the servicer were 
the same entity: the lender would retain and service the loan until it was 
fully repaid.z6 That traditional lending relationship, however, is now the 
exception. Third parties service most loans and do not have ownership 
rights to the loans they service.27 The reasons for this shift are several, 
but the most important reason is the steady rise of mortgage 
securitization, discussed below, as every securitized mortgage requires a 
third-party servicer.zs In the years leading up to the Great Recession, 
servicers experienced only minimal oversight.29 For depositories, the 
18 See supra note 17. 
19 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 70 (chart); Wilmarth, supra note 
17, at 1015-16. 
20 See supra note 19. 
21 See FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 88-89; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra 
note 12, at 25-27. 
22 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 88-89. 
23 See generally Adam J. Levitin & Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1 
(2011). 
24 Id. at 23. 
2s Id. 
26 Jd.at11. 
27 Id. at 11-13. 
28 Id. at 15-16. 
29 Id. at 52. 
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institution's charter determined the regulator, and nonbank servicers 
were not subject to federal supervision.3o 
3. Securitization. The third and final component of the residential 
mortgage lending system is securitization. Although not earlier part of 
the lending system, today it shapes nearly every aspect of it. 
Securitization involves the creation, packaging, and sale of residential 
mortgage-backed securities (RMBSs).31 A mortgage-backed security is a 
debt obligation, where the holder of the security has a claim to the cash 
flows from pools of mortgage loans.32 For more than three decades, the 
steady trend has been toward originators selling ownership rights to the 
loans they make on the secondary mortgage market.33 Today, the 
majority of mortgages are securitized. Government-sponsored 
enterprises (GSEs, namely Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac), and private 
financial institutions (like JP Morgan or Goldman Sachs), underwrite 
and issue these securities after purchasing and packaging mortgage 
loans from originators.34 While the GSEs for years securitized prime 
mortgages, in the early 2000s the investment banks turned to 
securitizing subprime mortgages, as well.3s The forces behind the 
securitization trend are several and include both demand for capital to 
ensure a steady stream of funding for mortgages, and a desire by 
originators to mitigate risks.36 In many ways, the rise of mortgage 
securitization fueled the entire enterprise, as it provided demand and 
financing for new mortgages, especially the higher risk Alt-A and 
subprime loans. 
B. The Seven Deadly Sins 
The AGs in this story targeted seven types of wrongdoing-the 
"seven deadly sins," you might say-within the mortgage lending 
system. Although I am not arguing for the causes of the Great 
30 In August 2013, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau began supervising nonbank 
mortgage servicers. See Procedural Rule to Establish Supervisory Authority Over Certain 
Nonbank Covered Persons Based on Risk Determination, 78 Fed. Reg. 40,352 (July 3, 2013) (to be 
codified at 12 C.P.R. pt. 1091). 
31 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 42-45; Viral V. Acharya 
& Matthew Richardson, How Securitization Concentrated Risk in the Financial Sector, in WHAT 
CAUSED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS, supra note 12, at 183, 183-99; Ingrid Gould Ellen et al., The 
Secondary Market for Housing Finance in the United States: A Brief Overview, in THE AMERICAN 
MORTGAGE SYSTEM: CRISIS AND REFORM, supra note 12, at 7-25; ENGEL & MCCOY, supra note 12, 
at 17-19; Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 28 CARDOZO L. REv 2185 
(2007). 
32 See supra note 31. 
33 See supra note 31. 
34 See supra note 31. 
35 See Acharya & Richardson, supra note 31, at 187. 
36 See supra note 31. 
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Recession, 37 I do assume that these harms either causally contributed to 
the crisis or exacerbated it. The first three sins all arose within the loan 
origination process: predatory lending, discriminatory lending, and 
mortgage fraud. Predatory lending takes many forms, but involves some 
type of unfair dealing by a lender, such as misrepresenting the terms of a 
loan, steering a borrower into a less favorable product than the 
borrower would otherwise qualify, misleading a consumer about his 
ability to repay, selling unnecessary products, or including abusive 
penalties and fees in the terms of the loan.3s 
Discriminatory lending can be a type of predatory lending. Most 
often discriminatory lending took the form of reverse redlining-
targeting certain populations on the basis of race or ethnic origin with 
predatory lending products.39 Although both predatory and 
discriminatory lending lie within the loan origination process, the 
incentives for both practices trace back in part to the securitization of 
mortgages that fueled a demand for sub prime mortgages on Wall 
Street. 4o 
The third deadly sin, mortgage fraud, also falls within the 
origination process. 41 These schemes may be simple or complex, 
involving one person or a network of individuals working in concert. 
"Fraud for housing" or "fraud for property" schemes typically aim to 
put a person in possession of a dwelling or property for which that 
person would not otherwise qualify, whereas "fraud for profit" schemes 
aim to generate financial gain without giving participants in the fraud 
possession of the house. 42 
Other harms fell within the loan servicing process. The fourth sin, 
loan servicing and foreclosure fraud, involves various failures on the 
part of the servicers to account properly for borrower activity in 
repaying the loan, as well as unfair or abusive practices in the 
foreclosure process. Mortgage rescue fraud, the fifth sin, does not 
37 For a discussion of these causes, see supra note 12. 
38 See, e.g., Predatory Lending, N AT'L Ass'N CONSUMER ADVOCS., http:/ /www.naca.net/issues/ 
predatory-lending (last visited Apr. 23, 2015). 
39 See Winnie F. Taylor, Eliminating Racial Discrimination in the Subprime Mortgage Market: 
Proposals for Fair Lending Reform, 18 J.L. & POL'Y 263,269-77 (2009). 
40 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 17-19. The American Civil Liberties Union has 
filed a class action lawsuit against Morgan Stanley based on the theory that the firm incentivized 
discriminatory lending. See Class Action Complaint, Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CIV. 7667, 
2012 WL 4856708 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 15, 2012). The district court denied the defendants' motion to 
dismiss plaintiffs' Fair Housing Act claim. Adkins v. Morgan Stanley, No. 12 CIV. 7667,2013 WL 
3835198 (S.D.N.Y. July 25, 2013) (order denying motion to dismiss in part). 
41 See FBI, 2010 MORTGAGE FRAUD REPORT: YEAR IN REVIEW 5 (2011), available at 
http://www.fbi.gov/stats-services/publications/mortgage-fraud-2010. Note that the FBI definition 
of "mortgage fraud" also includes what I call "mortgage rescue fraud" and "fraud in the servicing 
of mortgages." I use the term mortgage fraud more narrowly to cover only fraud for property and 
fraud for profit schemes. 
42 Id. 
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involve the actual loan servicers, but third parties-typically small 
companies and often a single individual-that target distressed 
homeowners with false promises to help. A typical scheme that repeated 
itself countless times involves a promise for services, an upfront fee for 
those services, and then a failure to deliver part or often all of the 
services promised. 43 
The final harms stem from the securitization process. The sixth sin 
involved fraud in the creation, package, and sale of residential 
mortgage-backed securities. 44 The financial institutions behind these 
securities often misrepresented the risk of the underlying assets. And the 
seventh sin involved fraud by the agencies that rated these securities, 
several of whom continued to give AAA ratings to toxic investments 
through the eve of the crisis. 4s 
This Article divides the story of how the Enforcers confronted 
these seven deadly sins into two Acts. The beginning of 2009 serves as a 
rough dividing point. By then the economic crisis was in clear view, 
following a dramatic unfolding of failures and rescues in the last half of 
2008. Within a few weeks into the new year, the nation had a new 
administration and a new Congress. At the same time, states shifted 
their focus as the crisis unfolded and as the Enforcers gained a deeper 
understanding of what was taking place and who was to blame. 
II. THE STORY OF THE ENFORCERS 
From 2000-2008, the Enforcers led the fight against mounting 
forces that resulted in the cataclysmic events of 2008. With one 
exception, they led with little help from federal law enforcement 
officials-and in some cases with opposition from them. 
A. Act I: Before the Fall (2000-2008) 
In this first part of the story, the Enforcers confronted head on 
some of the wrongdoing that would give rise to the events of 2008, while 
laying the groundwork for later actions in other areas. Most important, 
these states and their AGs confronted the deadly sins that stained the 
loan origination process, especially rampant predatory lending. 
43 See id. at 20-21. 
44 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 43-58. 
45 See id. at 47-51; Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Sues Standard & 
Poor's for Fraud in Rating Mortgage-Backed Securities in the Years Leading Up to the Financial 
Crisis (Feb. 5, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/February/13-ag-156.html 
(summarizing the Department of Justice civil fraud suit against Standard & Poor's (S&P)). 
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1. Predatory Lending 
Subprime lending is not, by definition, predatory. 46 In the best 
light, it creates opportunities that would otherwise not exist for a 
significant segment of the population. But for multiple reasons that I 
will not examine here, the subprime lending that lay behind the Great 
Recession was at times shockingly predatory. 47 Fueled by Wall Street's 
dollars and demand, the industry increasingly employed fraudulent 
tactics to bring new originations in the door. 
With a few exceptions, the federal government was missing in 
action from 2001-2008.48 A review of all Department of Justice Press 
releases during this time period relating to residential mortgage lending 
reveals not a single predatory lending case, even while abuses in the 
industry were rampant and peaked in 2006.49 The two primary 
regulators of nationally chartered depositories-the Office of Thrift 
Supervision (OTS) and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency-
issued very few enforcement orders, even though they were charged 
with consumer protection. so And even worse, not only were the federal 
regulators failing to hold wrongdoers accountable, but they also enabled 
the harm by waging an aggressive campaign to preempt new state laws 
46 See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REv. 1255, 1261 (2002). 
47 For an in-depth account of predatory lending leading up to the economic crisis, see 
MICHAEL W. HUDSON, THE MONSTER: HOW A GANG OF PREDATORY LENDERS AND WALL STREET 
BANKERS FLEECED AMERICA-AND SPAWNED A GLOBAL CRISIS (2010) and see also BETHANY 
MCLEAN & JOE NOCERA, ALL THE DEVILS ARE HERE: THE HIDDEN HISTORY OF THE FINANCIAL 
CRISIS (2011). 
48 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) was an exception. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade 
Comm'n, FTC Charges One of Nation's Largest Subprime Lenders with Abusive Lending 
Practices (Mar. 6, 2001), available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2001/03/ftc-
charges-one-nations-largest -subprime-lenders-abusive-lending (complaint against First Capital 
Corp. and Associates Corp. of North America); Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Charges 
that Sub-Prime Lenders Misrepresented Loan Terms to Consumers (Oct. 4, 2000), available at 
http:/ /www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2000/10/ftc-charges-sub-prime-lenders-
misrepresented-loan-terms-consumers (complaint against First Alliance Mortgage Co. 
(FAMCO)). Nonetheless, the role of the FTC was limited. The agency's resources were tight, the 
scope of its responsibilities broad, and most important, the agency lacked jurisdiction over federal 
depositories and their affiliates. See Julie L. Williams & Michael S. Bylsma, On the Same Page: 
Federal Banking Agency Enforcement of the FTC Act to Address Unfair and Deceptive Practices by 
Banks, 58 Bus. LAW. 1243, 1243-49 (2003). 
49 Spreadsheet of State and Federal Press Releases: 1999-2014 (on file with author). For press 
releases from July 1994 through January 2009, see Justice News Archive: Press Releases, U.S. DEP'T 
JuSTICE, http://www.justice.gov/opa/press-releases.html (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). For press 
releases from February 2009 through present, see Justice News, U.S. DEP'T JuSTICE, 
http:/ /www.justice.gov/opa/justicenews.php (last visited Apr. 24, 2015). 
so See Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., Turning a Blind Eye: Why Washington Keeps Giving in to Wall 
Street, 81 U. CIN. L. REv. 1283, 1338-40 (2013). 
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targeting predatory lending, state laws prohibiting unfair and deceptive 
practice ("UDAP" statutes), and state fair-lending laws.s1 
The reasons for federal inaction are many and are explored 
elsewhere,sz but the end result was a vast enforcement vacuum that the 
states filled. During this time period the states filed suits alleging 
predatory lending against five of the largest subprime lenders: First 
Alliance Mortgage Company (FAMCO), Household Finance 
Corporation (Household), Ameriquest Mortgage Company 
(Ameriquest), Fremont General and Fremont Investment and Loan 
(Fremont), and Countrywide Financial Corporation (Countrywide). 
The case against FAMCO, a nonbank mortgage lender 
headquartered in Orange County, was first. The company's founder and 
CEO, Brian Chisick, cut his teeth selling copies of the Encyclopedia 
Britannica door-to-door, later sold office machines, and then moved 
into the mortgage business.s3 Chisick opened FAMCO in 197l,s4 His 
success depended on two factors: an aggressive sales force recruited 
from large auto dealerships and money from Wall Street.ss He fine-
tuned a sales pitch known as the "Track," which he required his sales 
representatives to know forward and back. 56 The "Track" was scripted to 
disarm, distract, and ultimately mislead targets-usually people with 
poor credit histories-into believing they were acquiring a product in 
their best interests? The capital behind these products came from 
investors: first from private sources and later from Wall Street.ss By the 
end of the 1990s FAMCO's largest investor was Lehman Brothers, 
which provided capital by purchasing the mortgages, and then 
packaging and selling them as residential mortgage-backed securities 
(RMBS).s9 These investments enabled FAMCO to extend its reach 
across the nation. 
51 See id.; see also ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 157-59; Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth 
Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REv. 1, 79-83 (2008); Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. 
McCoy, Federal Preemption and Consumer Financial Protection: Past and Future, 31 BANKING & 
FIN. SERVICES POL'Y REP. 25 (2012); Catherine M. Sharkey, Inside Agency Preemption, llO MICH. 
L. REv. 521, 553-56 (2012); Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr., The Dodd-Frank Act's Expansion of State 
Authority to Protect Consumers of Financial Services, 36 J. CORP. L. 893, 910-15 (20ll). 
52 See Mark Totten, Credit Reform and the States: The Vital Role of Attorneys General After 
Dodd-Frank, 99 IOWA L. REV. ll5, 122-25 (2013). 
53 For background on the FAMCO case, see HUDSON, supra note 47 and Diana B. Henriques 
& Lowell Bergman, Profiting from Fine Print with Wall Street's Help, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15,2000, at 
Al. 
54 See supra note 53. 
55 See supra note 53. 
56 See supra note 53. 
57 See supra note 53. 
58 See supra note 53. 
59 See supra note 53. 
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By the mid-1990s, multiple AGs were receiving complaints about 
FAMCO. The need for public enforcement became increasingly clear.6o 
After extensive investigations, Illinois, Massachusetts, and Minnesota all 
initiated civil suits against FAMCO in 1998, and several other states 
followed, including California and New York.61 The FTC filed its own 
complaint in October 2000, citing violations of the federal UDAP as well 
as disclosure requirements under the Truth in Lending Act and 
Regulation Z, which implements the statute.62 The state complaints all 
alleged violations of the state UDAPs. According to the California 
complaint, FAMCO used telemarketing and direct mail solicitation to 
target homeowners with poor credit histories, especially the elderly.63 
Using the "Track" sales pitch, representatives would mislead consumers 
about the amount of origination fees, which ranged from 10% to 25% of 
the loan, as well as the interest rate and monthly payments on the 
adjustable rate mortgages (ARMs).64 For example, these loans typically 
included "teaser" interest rates that looked attractive, and in the case of 
refinancing would often lower the monthly payment, but would expire 
within six months and rapidly escalate.6s Representatives would suggest 
that the initial rate would stay constant unless market conditions 
deteriorated, when in fact they automatically climbed.66 Using this 
method, FAMCO sold thousands of subprime loans nationwide.67 
The states, the FTC, and private plaintiffs settled with FAMCO in 
March 2002 for $60 million.6s FAMCO faced a court-ordered 
liquidation, an order for Chisick to pay $20 million of the settlement out 
60 See HUDSON, supra note 47, at 109. 
61 See The Causes and Current State of the Financial Crisis: Hearing Before the Fin. Crisis 
Inquiry Comm'n 4 (2010) (testimony of Lisa Madigan, Illinois Att'y Gen.) [hereinafter Madigan 
Testimony], available at http:/ /fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/20 10-0114-
Madigan.pdf; Promoting Homeownership by Ensuring Liquidity in the Subprime Mortgage Market: 
Joint Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Fin. Insts. & Consumer Credit and the Subcomm. on 
Housing & Cmty. Opportunity 1-2,5 (2004) (testimony of Pamela Kogut, Massachusetts Assistant 
Att'y Gen.), available at http:/ /democrats.financialservices.house.gov/media/pdf/062304pk.pdf. 
Other states included Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Minnesota, and New York. 
62 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Home Mortgage Lender Settles "Predatory Lending" 
Charges (Mar. 21, 2002), available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2002/03/ 
home-mortgage-lender-settles-predatory-lending-charges. 
63 Press Release, State of Cal. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General 
Brings Consumer Protection Action Against Major "Subprime" Lender in California (June 12, 






68 Press Release, State of Cal. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General Bill 
Lockyer Announces Settlement of Major Predatory Lender Lawsuit (Mar. 21, 2002), available at 
http :I I oag.ca.gov /news/ press-releases/ attorney -general-bill-lockyer -announces-settlement-rna j or-
predatory-lender; Press Release, supra note 62. 
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of his own pocket, and Chisick was banned from lending in the states 
that brought suit. 69 The FTC claimed the settlement at the time was its 
largest recovery against a predatory lender, and the second largest 
settlement in the history of the FTC. 7o 
The next big case was against an even larger participant in the 
subprime lending world, Household Finance, which by time of the 
settlement faced a united front of all fifty states-a rare demonstration 
of solidarity. 71 Also joining the state AGs in this case and other 
predatory lending actions were several state banking regulators, which 
extended the jurisdictional reach of the law enforcement team beyond 
the typical multistate action.72 Based outside of Chicago, Household was 
a major subprime lender. The company had extended $100 billion in 
loans to 50 million customers-primarily subprime mortgages to 
borrowers with bad credit histories. 73 Allegations were similar to what 
the states had encountered with FAMCO: misrepresentations 
concerning loan points, origination fees, and interest rates; misleading 
consumers about the necessity and benefits of accompanying insurance 
products; misleading borrowers about prepayment penalties; and 
undisclosed balloon payments. 74 These practices, the states claimed, 
violated their state UDAP laws.7s 
Household finally agreed to a landmark $525 million settlement in 
October 2002, which dwarfed the already record-setting settlement with 
FAMCO and covered residential loans from 1999 up to the time of 
settlement.76 Leading the talks was Iowa AG Tom Miller, who at the 
time chaired the Subprime Lending Committee of the National 
Association of Attorneys General (NAAG).77 This resolution was 
notable in two ways. First, at the time it was the largest direct restitution 
69 Press Release, supra note 62. 
70 Diana B. Henriques, A Home Lender in a Settlement for $60 Million, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 
2002, at Al. 
71 See generally HUDSON, supra note 47, at 168-72; Peter Eavis, Lawsuits and Regulators 
Shadow Big Lender's Future, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 17, 2002, at C1; Martha McNeil Hamilton, 
Household International to Repay Borrowers, HONOLULU ADVERTISER (Oct. 12, 2002), 
http:/ /the.honoluluadvertiser.com/ article/2002/0ct/ 12/bz/bz09a.html. 
n For example, the State of Washington Department of Financial Institutions played a key 
role. See Sally Peacock, How the Household Settlement Uncorked a Law Enforcement Bottleneck 
(Fall2003) (unpublished paper, Columbia Law School), available at http:/ /web.law.columbia.edu/ 
sites/default/files/microsites/career-services/How%20the%20Household%20Settlement%20 
Uncorked%20a%20Law%20Enforcement%20Bottleneck.pdf. Banking regulators were important 
partners in states where the state consumer protection act did not reach the credit industry. See id. 
at24. 
73 See Hamilton, supra note 71. 
74 See, e.g., Complaint, Iowa v. Household Int'l, at 2-5 (not filed with court). 
75 Id. at 5. 
76 See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller: Iowa's Share 
of Household Settlement Could Reach about $1.3 Million (Oct. 11, 2002), available at 
http:/ /www.state.ia. us/government/ ag/latest_news/releases/ oct_2002/Household_Iowa.html. 
77 See Hamilton, supra note 71; Press Release, supra note 76. 
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consumer protection settlement ever reached by a state or federal 
government. 78 Second, the settlement included extensive injunctive 
relief that many states hoped would serve as a model for future 
settlements and legislative reforms. 79 Among the terms was a limit on 
prepayment penalties to only the first two years of a loan; a requirement 
to ensure the loan provided an actual benefit to the consumer; limits on 
points and origination fees; and improved disclosure requirements.8o 
The leaders behind the Household settlement turned next to 
Ameriquest.81 At the time of settlement, it was the largest subprime 
lender in the nation. The company was the baby of Ronald Arnall, a 
California businessman whose lending empire made him a billionaire 
and one of the nation's wealthiest people by 2004.82 Arnall launched his 
business as a small thrift in 1979, but in 1994 transformed the company 
into a nonbank mortgage lender that made loans through independent 
mortgage brokers and retail operations.83 The company experienced 
explosive growth through the same formula that FAMCO employed-
aggressive sales tactics and Wall Street investment. And its name was 
well known-the result of an aggressive marketing campaign that 
included a NASCAR race, the Ameriquest 300; two blimps; and the 2005 
Ameriquest Mortgage Super Bowl XXXIX Halftime Show.84 
By now, closing the mortgage deal involved poorly underwritten 
and fraudulently documented loans. For example, AG investigations 
revealed that Ameriquest secured inflated appraisals.8s Moreover, they 
also discovered widespread use of fabricated or inflated income on loan 
applications, which were encouraged or recorded by Ameriquest 
representatives.86 As Illinois AG Lisa Madigan would testify before the 
Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, "For those of us on the state level, 
the Ameriquest investigation marks the moment when we began to see 
78 Household to Pay Record Fine and Change Lending Practices, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12, 2002, at 
C4; Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller: All Fifty States Join 
Settlement with Household Finance (Dec. 16, 2002), available at http://www.state.ia.us/ 
government/ ag/latest_news/releases/ dec_2002/hhold.html. 
79 See Prentiss Cox, The Importance of Deceptive Practice Enforcement in Financial Institution 
Regulation, 30 PACE L. REv. 279,295 (2009). 
80 Press Release, supra note 78. 
81 See HUDSON, supra note 47, at 172. 
82 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 26; HUDSON, supra note 47, at 224-46 (for a longer 
account). 
83 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 47, at 26. 
84 See HUDSON, supra note 47, at 221, 228. 
85 See, e.g., Complaint at 6, People v. Ameriquest Mortg. Co., No. RG06260804 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Mar. 21, 2006), available at http:/ /oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/06-005_ 
Oa.pdf; Press Release, State of Cal. Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General 
Lockyer Announces $325 Million Settlement with Ameriquest to Resolve National Predatory 
Lending Case (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http:/ /oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/attorney-general-
lockyer-announces-325-million -settlement -ameriquest-resolve. 
86 See supra note 85. 
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the underwriting practices of mortgage lenders erode at a disturbingly 
accelerated pace."s? 
The Enforcers all led in the investigation. Iowa, California, New 
York, and Illinois (along with Washington) formed the negotiation 
team, with Iowa AG Tom Miller again at the helm.ss After more than 
two years of investigation and negotiations, the states and Ameriquest 
agreed on a $325 million settlement in January 2006, making it the 
second largest consumer protection settlement after the Household 
deal.s9 Like its predecessor, the Ameriquest settlement included 
important injunctive provisions like a procedure for ensuring appraisal 
independence, a prohibition on encouraging borrowers to misstate 
income sources and amounts, and reforms to the incentive system for 
sales representatives.9o In crafting this settlement, Madigan explained 
that the intent was to create "a lender code of conduct" that would serve 
as a model for broader reforms.91 
The FAMCO, Household, and Ameriquest cases all demonstrated 
remarkable coordination among the AGs. But sometimes they acted 
alone. Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley's investigation and 
enforcement action against California-based Fremont from 2007-2008, 
shortly after taking office, is one example.n In making her case, Coakley 
claimed that Fremont failed to assess borrowers' ability to repay, and 
that this failure amounted to a UDAP violation.93 Moreover, Coakley 
also found rampant abuses in the foreclosure process. Fremont sold its 
loans to Wall Street, but agreed to act as the servicer. Among other 
problems, Coakley's investigation revealed that Fremont purported to 
offer a loan modification program, but charged additional fees for the 
service without ever providing any help. 94 
87 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 4. 
88 Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Ameriquest Will Pay $325 
Million and Reform its Lending Practices (Jan. 23, 2006), available at http://www.state.ia.us/ 
government/ ag/latest_news/releases/jan_2006/ Ameriquest_Iowa.html. 
89 Kirstin Downey, Mortgage Lender Settles Lawsuit, WASH. POST, Jan. 24, 2006, 
http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/ content/ article/2006/0 1/23/ AR20060 1230 1523.html. 
90 See, e.g., Permanent Injunction and Final Judgment at 12-35, People v. Ameriquest Mortg. 
Co., No. RG06260804 (Cal. Super. Ct. Mar. 21, 2006), available at http://oag.ca.gov/system/files/ 
attachments/press_releases/06-005 _Ob. pdf?. 
91 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 5. 
92 ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 184-85; Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., 
Commonwealth of Mass., Attorney General Martha Coakley Files Lawsuit Against National 
Mortgage Lender-Fremont Investment and Loan (Oct. 5, 2007) (on file with author); Marc Tracy, 
Mass. AG Sues Lender for Predatory Loans, LAW 360 (Oct. 17, 2007, 12:00 AM), 
http:/ /www.law360.com/ articles/3 7738/mass-ag -sues-lender-for-predatory -loans. 
93 Complaint~ 20, Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373 (Mass. Super. Ct. 
Oct. 4, 2007). 
94 Id. ~~ 110-16. Fremont was a state-chartered bank not regulated by the Federal Reserve, 
and, therefore, under the powers of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC). In one of 
the otherwise rare instances of federal involvement, the FDIC issued a Cease and Desist Order 
against Fremont on March 7, 2007 for its predatory practices. Order to Cease and Desist, In re 
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The enforcement action resulted in two significant outcomes, in 
addition to $10 million to the state. First, on application for a 
preliminary injunction the trial court held9s that under these 
circumstances a lender's failure to assess a borrower's ability to repay or 
to issue a loan that predictably will result in foreclosure ("designed to 
fail") is unfair and in violation of the state's UD AP law. 96 Although most 
of these cases brought by AGs went straight to negotiations, 
Massachusetts chose to litigate for more than a year and a half before 
settling. This decision both allowed the state to better tell the story of the 
abuses by predatory lenders and also to establish valuable precedent. In 
part as a result of this case, Massachusetts had one of the most expansive 
UDAP statutes in the nation. As we will see, the Fremont injunction 
proved helpful in other cases. The second significant outcome was the 
trial court's creation of a notice and objection system that ultimately 
required court approval for a foreclosure if Fremont could not remedy 
any concerns of the attorney general.97 
After a series of record-setting cases, the Enforcers turned next to 
Countrywide Financial, a state-licensed nonbank mortgage lender 
which by 2005 had become the nation's largest subprime lender under 
the leadership of its CEO, Angelo Mozilo.9s From 2000 to 2006, the 
firm's reported securities trading volume grew from $647 billion to $2.9 
trillion.99 
Although most states eventually joined in the settlement, Illinois 
AG Lisa Madigan and then California AG Jerry Brown launched the 
investigation in Fall 2007 and led settlement negotiations the following 
summer.1oo The investigations revealed fraudulent practices aimed at 
Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. FDIC-07-035b (FDIC Mar. 7 2007), available at http://www.fdic.gov/ 
bank/individual/enforcement/2007-03-00.pdf. Knowing this order was coming, Fremont shut 
down its subprime lending operations. See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 184-85. 
95 Commonwealth v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, No. 07-4373-BLS, 2008 WL 517279, at *10 (Mass. 
Super. Ct. Feb. 26, 2008), affd, 452 Mass. 733 (Mass. 2008). 
96 Commenting on this holding, Professor Kathleen Engel stated: "The Fremont case was 
probably one of the most important [mortgage fraud] cases nationwide." Jenifer B. McKim, 
Coakley Blazes Path as Advocate for Homeowners, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 19. 2011, 
http:/ /www.boston.com/business/ articles/20 11/12/ 19/massachusetts_attorney _general_ martha_ 
coakley _blazes_path_fighting_alleged_foreclosure_fraud (alteration in original). For extended 
discussion criticizing this ruling, see Wayne van Rooyen, Massachusetts v. Fremont Predatory 
Lending and the Creation of an Extraordinary Ex Post Facto Suitability Standard, 5 Bus. L. BRIEF 
(AM. U.) 59 (2008). 
97 Fremont Inv. & Loan, 2008 WL 517279, at *16-17. 
98 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 26-27; HUDSON, supra note 47, at 211; Dina 
ElBoghdady, Bank of America to Modify Mortgages from Countrywide, WASH. POST, Oct. 7, 2008, 
at D3; Gretchen Morgenson, Illinois Suit Set Against Countrywide, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2008, at 
Cl. 
99 Complaint~ 28, People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. LC-081846 (Cal. Super. Ct. June 24, 
2008), available at http:/ /oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/press_releases/n1582_draft_cwide_ 
complaint2.pdf?. 
1oo Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 5-6; ElBoghdady, supra note 98. 
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maximizing loan volume akin to what the states had discovered in all 
the earlier cases.1o1 The case was striking in part because of the size of 
the settlement: an estimated $8.7 billion (recall that the previous record 
was Household at $484 million),1o2 although the actual value was less 
than this amount.1o3 
The settlement terms were unique in a few respects. To the regret 
of Madigan and Brown, the settlement did not include injunctive relief 
as had the previous deals.1o4 During the course of the AG's investigation 
Countrywide transferred its loan origination operations from its state-
licensed subsidiary to its federally chartered thrift subsidiary.1os This act 
of regulatory arbitrage allowed Countrywide to enjoy the strong 
preemption policies defended by the Office of Thrift Supervision, which 
severely limited state powers.1o6 At the same time, the settlement was 
notable for establishing the first loan modification program in the 
nation-an important precedent for later settlements.1o7 Coming during 
the rise of the foreclosure crisis, several of the states involved in 
negotiation pushed hard for this program, which set a standard for 
future foreclosure policy.1os 
At the same time that the AGs were bringing these predatory 
lending cases against some of the nation's largest subprime lenders, then 
New York AG Cuomo was also eyeing the appraisal system.1o9 As the 
101 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 5-6. 
102 ElBoghdady, supra note 98. The settlement later grew. While the other AGs signed off on 
the $8.4 billion deal, Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley refused to consent, concluding it was too 
easy on Countrywide. Eighteen months later, under pressure from Coakley, Countrywide 
allocated another $3 billion in mortgage assistance, a portion of which went to Massachusetts. 
McKim, supra note 96; Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., AG 
Coakley Secures $3 Billion in Loan Modifications for Homeowners Nationwide in Agreement 
with Mortgage Lending Giant Countrywide (Mar. 24, 2010), available at http://www.mass.gov/ 
ago/ news-and-updates/press-releases/ 20 10/ ag -coakley-secures-3-billion-in -loan.h tml. 
103 See Alex Ulam, The Bank of America Mortgage Settlement Fiasco, NATION, Oct. 13, 2010, 
http://www. thenation.com/article/ 155380/bank -america-mortgage-settlement-fiasco. 
104 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 7. 
10s Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 6. 
106 Subsidiaries and Equity Investments, 61 Fed. Reg. 66,561 (Dec. 18, 1996) (codified at 12 
C.P.R. pts. 545, 559, 560, 563, 567, 571); Lending and Investment, 61 Fed. Reg. 50,951 (Sept. 30, 
1996) (codified at 12 C.P.R. pts. 545, 556, 560, 563, 566, 571, 590); see also supra note 51. 
107 Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Illinois Attorney General Madigan Leads $8.7 Billion 
Groundbreaking Settlement of Lawsuit Against Mortgage Giant Countrywide (Oct. 6, 2008), 
available at http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2008_10/20081006.html; see also 
Gretchen Morgenson, Countrywide to Set Aside $8.4 Billion in Loan Aid, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2008, 
atBl. 
108 See, e.g., Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., AGs Reach 
Agreement with Countrywide Financial that Will Help Borrowers Facing Foreclosure (Oct. 6, 
2008), available at http:/ /www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/oct_2008/ 
Countrywide.html. 
109 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., NY Attorney General Sues First American 
and Its Subsidiary for Conspiring with Washington Mutual to Inflate Real Estate Appraisals (Nov. 
1, 2007), available at http:/ /www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ny-attorney-general-sues-first-
american-and-its-subsidiary-conspiring-washington; see also Vikas Bajaj, New York Says 
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AG's discovered during the Ameriquest investigation, subprime lending 
practices had compromised appraiser independence.no After a nine-
month investigation, General Cuomo filed suit against eAppraiseiT.m 
The complaint charged that eAppraiseiT colluded with Washington 
Mutual, a major subprime lender, to use a list of preferred appraisers 
willing to inflate the value of homes. 112 A week after filing suit, Cuomo 
sent subpoenas to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac seeking information on 
the mortgages they purchased from banks-including Washington 
Mutual-and the due diligence practices the financiers used for 
assessing appraisals.m Within a few months, Fannie and Freddie agreed 
to buy loans only from banks that followed new standards.n4 The new 
policy, which Cuomo helped craft, came under strong criticism from 
many sides that claimed it exacerbated the problems and added costs for 
consumers.m After losing a fight to have the lawsuit dismissed on 
grounds of preemption, eAppraiseiT agreed to a $7.8 million settlement 
and voluntarily left the appraisal business.n6 
2. Discriminatory Lending 
Predatory and discriminatory lending often go hand-in-hand. In 
particular, predatory lenders often engage in what is called "reverse 
redlining": targeting a certain population for predatory loans based on 
that population's race or other similar characteristics.m The years 
leading up to the Great Recession were no exception. And once again it 
was the states-and especially the Enforcers-that led in combating this 
practice. 
During the height of the subprime lending boom the federal 
government did not bring a single enforcement action to stop reverse 
Appraiser Inflated Value of Homes, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2007, at C3; New York Widens Inquiry on 
Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 8, 2007, at C8. 
110 See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
Ill Press Release, supra note 109. 
112 Id. 
113 Id.; see also New York Widens Inquiry on Mortgages, supra note 109. 
114 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., New York Attorney General Cuomo 
Announces Agreement with Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and OFHEO (Mar. 3, 2008), available at 
http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/new-york-attorney-general-cuomo-announces-agreement-
fannie-mae-freddie-mac-and -ofheo. 
115 David Streitfeld, In Appraisal Shift, Lenders Gain Power and Critics, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 
2009, http:/ /www.nytimes.com/2009/08/ 19/business/ 19appraise.html. 
116 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., A. G. Schneiderman Secures $7.8 Million 
Settlement with First American Corporation and eAppraiseiT for Role in Housing Market 
Meltdown (Sept. 28, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
secures-78-million -settlement-first -american -corporation -and. 
117 See Taylor, supra note 39. 
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redlining by mortgage lenders.us At the end of the Clinton 
Administration in 2000, the Justice Department along with other federal 
partners brought an action against Delta Funding Corporation.u9 The 
next federal action did not come until late in 2008, when the Justice 
Department reached a $185,000 settlement with a small state-chartered 
bank in Alabama for charging higher interest rates to African 
Americans who took loans out on manufactured homes.12o 
Leading the charge initially for the states was then New York AG 
Eliot Spitzer. In April 2005 Spitzer launched an investigation of eight 
major national banks, seeking information from the institutions about 
their lending practices to determine whether they violated state fair 
lending laws.121 He was armed with newly released data under the Home 
Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA), a federal law requiring lenders to 
publicly disclose information about loan applications and originations, 
including demographic information about the applicants.m The Federal 
Reserve, which implements the law, had amended its disclosure 
requirements to allow users to identify the race and ethnicity of 
118 See generally U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GA0-09-704, FAIR LENDING: DATA 
LIMITATIONS AND THE FRAGMENTED U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY STRUCTURE CHALLENGE 
FEDERAL OVERSIGHT AND ENFORCEMENT EFFORTS 53-61 (2009), available at 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d09704.pdf; Charlie Savage, Report Examines Civil Rights 
Enforcement During Bush Years, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 3, 2009, at A26. 
119 Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC, DOJ and HUD Announce Action to Combat 
Abusive Lending Practices (Mar. 30, 2000), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2000/03/ftc-doj -and-hud -announce-action -combat -abusive-lending -practices. The case 
later settled. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev., Delta Funding Corporation 
Settles U.S. Charges of Fair Lending and Consumer Law Violations (Mar. 30, 2000), available at 
http:/ I archives.hud.gov /news/2000/pr00-67 .html. 
12o Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Resolves Case Alleging Race 
Discrimination by Alabama Bank (Sept. 29, 2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/ 
2008/September/08-crt-864.html. In the final days of 2008, the FTC also filed a complaint and 
settlement with Gateway Funding, a home mortgage lender, for charging higher fees to African-
American and Hispanic customers. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Mortgage Lender Agrees 
to Settle FTC Charges that It Charged African-Americans and Hispanics Higher Prices for Loans 
(Dec. 16, 2008), available at http:/ /www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2008/12/mortgage-
lender-agrees-settle-ftc-charges-it-charged-african; see also John L. Ropiequet, Fair Lending 
Litigation and the Impact ofWal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 158, 
163 n.73 (2012). 
121 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Countrywide Agrees to New Measures to 
Combat Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Mortgage Loan Pricing (Dec. 5, 2006) [hereinafter Press 
Release, Countrywide Agrees], available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/countrywide-
agrees-new-measures-combat-racial-and -ethnic-disparities-mortgage-loan; Press Release, N.Y. 
State Office of the Att'y Gen., Fed Study Confirms Racial Lending Disparities (Sept. 14, 2005), 
available at http:/ /www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/fed-study-confirms-racial-lending-disparities; see 
also Kirstin Downey, Spitzer Launches Inquiry into Lending Bias, WASH. POST, Apr. 29, 2005, at 
El. 
122 12 u.s.c. §§ 2801-2809 (2012). 
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consumers who received subprime loans. 123 But Spitzer wanted more 
detailed, nonpublic information from the banks. 
With one exception,124 the banks balked and together with their 
federal regulator, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), 
filed suit in federal court to stop Spitzer's investigation and potential 
enforcement action. 125 They argued that OCC regulations under the 
National Bank Act prohibited state investigation or enforcement of state 
laws against national banks. In the short-term the banks and their 
federal regulator won-litigation dragged on past Spitzer's term in office 
and halted the investigation. But when the U.S. Supreme Court decided 
Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n in 2009, it was largely a win for the 
AGs.126 The Court in part rejected the agency's interpretation of the 
statute and the scope of the agency's powers, while affirming the power 
of states to enforce their general laws-including fair lending laws-
against national banks.127 
Before the Court ruled in Clearing House, AG Coakley in 
Massachusetts filed a major lawsuit in June 2008 against Option One 
and its parent company, H&R Block, alleging both predatory and 
discriminatory lending practices.12s Option One was a nonbank, 
subprime mortgage lender with an extensive national presence. 
Coakley's suit was the first in the nation to charge a subprime lender 
with discriminatory lending after the crash of the subprime market.129 
Her investigation revealed that Option One charged higher points and 
fees to African-American and Latino borrowers, and targeted these 
123 Home Mortgage Disclosure, 67 Fed. Reg. 7222, 7228 (Feb. 15, 2002) (codified at 12 C.P.R. 
pt. 203). The Federal Reserve began the process of requiring pricing disclosure in late 2000, after 
several federal agencies held hearings on the rise of predatory lending. Id. at 7222. 
124 Countrywide fully complied with the demand and entered into an agreement with New 
York to increase its fair lending monitoring activities, compensate borrowers who were harmed, 
and educate consumers. Press Release, Countrywide Agrees, supra note 121. 
125 Complaint, Clearing House Ass'n v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 5629(SHS), 2005 WL 1803330 
(S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2005) (industry suit); Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Preliminary Injunction 
and Permanent Injunction, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency v. Spitzer, No. 05 Civ. 5636, 
2005 WL 5153922 (S.D.N.Y. June 16, 2005) (OCC suit). For a chronology of events, see 
Preemption of State Law Enforcement, 123 HARV. L. REv. 322,323 (2009). 
126 557 u.s. 519 (2009). 
127 Id. at 535-36. Congress later codified this ruling. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act of2010 § 1047, 12 U.S. C.§ 25b (2012). Clearing House Ass'n came with 
some limitations, in particular on investigation. The holding would seem to prevent AGs from 
engaging in pre-complaint discovery outside the judicial process against national banks as an 
effort to determine whether or not to file a law enforcement action, as inconsistent with the 
federal government's exclusive "visitorial powers." Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. at 531, 536. 
128 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., Attorney General Martha 
Coakley Files Lawsuit Against National Mortgage Lender Option One and Parent H&R Block for 
Deceptive and Discriminatory Lending Practices (June 3, 2008) (on file with author); see also 
Massachusetts Settles Suit Against a Mortgage Lender, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2011, at B4. 
129 See supra note 128. 
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same consumers with predatory mortgage products.l3o Option One 
eventually settled with the state for $125 million, with commitments to 
modify affected loans.l31 
Around that same time, Illinois AG Lisa Madigan opened 
investigations into the fair lending practices of Wells Fargo and 
Countrywide, 132 just a few months before filing her predatory lending 
suit against the latter. 133 The catalyst for Madigan's probe was a 
December 2007 article in the Chicago Reporter.l34 Based on an 
examination of HMDA data, the report concluded that African-
American borrowers in the Chicago area were two-and-a-half times as 
likely to receive a high-cost loan as white borrowers in the years 
preceding the crisis.m By March of that next year, Madigan had 
subpoenaed Wells Fargo and Countrywide for more data. The Second 
Circuit Court of Appeals had just ruled against AGs in Clearing House 
Ass'n v. Cuomo, concluding that the National Bank Act and OCC 
regulations prohibited states from enforcing their laws against national 
banks, and prohibited investigations in support of such actions.l36 
Although Countrywide provided data, Wells Fargo moved its mortgage 
operations under OCC jurisdiction and then claimed that Illinois lacked 
authority to obtain the requested documents.m 
As already explained, the U.S. Supreme Court issued the final word 
in June 2009, restoring most of the powers to the AGs.l3s With the path 
cleared to reach a national bank, 139 Madigan filed suit against Wells 
Fargo one month later. Her complaint alleged that the firm pushed 
African Americans and Latinos into subprime loans when they 
130 See Complaint, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., No. 08-2474-BLS (Mass. Super. Ct. 
June 3, 2008). 
131 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., H&R BLOCK Mortgage 
Company Will Provide $125 Million in Loan Modifications and Restitution (Aug. 9, 2011), 
available at http:/ /www.mass.gov/ ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/20 11/ option -one-
settlement.html; see also Massachusetts Settles Suit Against a Mortgage Lender, supra note 128. 
132 Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Illinois Attorney General Madigan Issues New Subpoenas to 
Countrywide and Wells Fargo (Mar. 6, 2008), available at http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
pressroom/2008_03/20080306.html. 
133 See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. 
134 Kimbriell Kelly, The High Price of Home Ownership, CHI. REP. (Dec. 1, 2007), 
http:/ /www.chicagoreporter.com/high-price-home-ownership#.Usbvb7SOZjs; see also Madigan 
Testimony, supra note 61, at 6-7. 
m An Equal Opportunity to Pay More, CHI. REP. (July 2, 2008), http://chicagoreporter.com/ 
equal-opportunity-pay-more. 
136 Clearing House Ass'n v. Cuomo, 510 F.3d 105 (2d Cir. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part sub 
nom. Cuomo v. Clearing House Ass'n, 557 U.S. 519 (2009). 
137 Complaint ~ 8, People v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 09CH26434 (Ill. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2009), 
available at http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2009 _07 /WELLS%20F ARG0%20 
COMPLAINT _07 -31-2009 _13-44-30.pdf. 
138 See supra notes 126-27 and accompanying text. 
139 Madigan testified: "In fact, the Cuomo ruling green-lighted my decision to file a fair 
lending lawsuit against Wells Fargo." Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 11. 
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otherwise qualified for prime loans (a process called "steering"), or at a 
cost significantly higher than similarly-situated white borrowers.14o Like 
Madigan's case against Countrywide for predatory lending, this case was 
ambitious. Wells Fargo was one of the largest lenders in the nation 
during that time, and by 2008 was the largest residential lender, 
originating one out of every four mortgages in the nation.141 A year later 
Madigan also filed suit against Countrywide, making similar 
allegations.142 
Before the parties settled, the U.S. Department of Justice joined 
Madigan, expanding the scope of her efforts across the nation.143 Both 
firms finally settled: Countrywide in late 2011 for $335 million;144 and 
Wells Fargo in summer 2012 for $175 million.14s Madigan won two 
landmark cases. According to the Justice Department, the cases were the 
first and second largest fair lending settlements in the Department's 
history, dwarfing the previous $6.1 million record.146 Moreover, the 
cases represented the first time the Justice Department alleged and won 
relief for consumers who were victims of steering. For Madigan's part, 
she became the first AG to sue a national bank for its role in the 
140 Complaint, Wells Fargo & Co., supra note 137, at 2. 
141 Complaint ~ 4, United States v. Wells Fargo Bank, No 1:12-cv-01150 (D.D.C. July 12, 
20 12), available at http:/ /www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/95120 12712113719995136.pdf; see 
also Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Sues Wells Fargo for Discriminatory and Deceptive 
Mortgage Lending Practices (July 31, 2009), available at http://www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/ 
pressroom/2009 _07 /20090731.html. 
142 Complaint ~ 4, People v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 102CH27929 (Ill. Cir. Ct. June 29, 
2010); Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Sues Countrywide for Discrimination Against 
African American and Latino Borrowers (June 29, 2010), available at 
http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov /pressroom/20 10 _ 06/201 00629b.html. 
143 Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Reaches $335 Million Settlement to 
Resolve Allegations of Lending Discrimination by Countrywide Financial Corporation (Dec. 21, 
2011), available at http:/ /www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2011/December/11-ag-1694.html; Press 
Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Justice Department Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo Resulting 
in More than $175 Million in Relieffor Homeowners to Resolve Fair Lending Claims (July 12, 
2012) [hereinafter Press Release, DOJ Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo], available at 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/July/12-dag-869.html. 
144 Charlie Savage & Nelson D. Schwartz, Countrywide Will Settle a Bias Suit, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
22, 2011, at B1; Press Release, DOJ Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo, supra note 143; Press 
Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan, U.S. DOJ Reach $335 Million Settlement with 
Countrywide/Bank of America Over Discriminatory Lending (Dec. 21, 2011), available at 
http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/20 11_12/20 111221.html. 
145 Charlie Savage, Wells Fargo Will Settle Mortgage Bias Charges, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 2012, at 
B3; Press Release, DOJ Reaches Settlement with Wells Fargo, supra note 143; Press Release, Ill. 
Att'y Gen., Madigan, U.S. DOJ Reach $175 Million Settlement with Wells Fargo over 
Discriminatory Lending (July 12, 2012), available at http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/ 
2012_07/20120712.html. In addition, the settlements also contained extensive injunctive relief 
that applied to both Wells Fargo employees and independent mortgage brokers that might sell the 
company's products. Consent Decree~ 7, Wells Fargo Bank, No. 1:12-cv-011150. 
146 Savage & Schwartz, supra note 144. 
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economic crisis, as well as the first to bring and resolve a fair lending 
claim against the same.147 
3. Other Actions 
The most significant contribution by the Enforcers and their other 
state partners during this time was their serial enforcement actions 
against predatory and discriminatory lending.14s These efforts were 
especially important given federal inaction and sometimes antagonism. 
But the AGs acted in other areas and ways, as well. They brought dozens 
of enforcement actions against individuals and small firms that, 
collectively, were significant contributing causes to the coming crisis. 
They laid the groundwork for major actions that would only ripen after 
the crisis hit. And they were advocates at the state and federal level for 
structural reform. 
By 2006 at the height of the subprime-lending boom, and then for 
many years after, these states (and others) were bringing dozens of 
enforcement actions to stop mortgage fraud. These schemes usually 
involved an individual or a small group of people who work together to 
fraudulently obtain loans for profit.149 The states sometimes brought 
criminal charges. The 2008 case against the San della Group out of New 
York is exemplary.1so From at least 2001-2006, the members of this 
enterprise collaborated to steal millions of dollars from financial 
institutions.1s1 After recruiting people to pose as legitimate real estate 
buyers, they would supply lenders with false information about the 
straw buyer's employment, income, and other assets, along with false 
appraisal reports.1s2 Typically, they would inflate a property's value by 
$100,000 or more, pocket the surplus, and then let the loan go into 
default.1s3 These schemes were repeated hundreds of times across the 
nation, contributed to the crisis, and AGs were at the front lines of 
response. 
Several years before the bursting of the housing bubble and the 
onset of the foreclosure crisis, a new menace that emerged was the 
mortgage rescue scam: various schemes whereby wrongdoers preyed on 
147 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 11; John L. Ropiequet, The Supreme Court Limits 
Federal Preemption in Cuomo v. Clearing House Association, L.L.C., 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. 
REP. 146,83 (2009). 
148 Spreadsheet of State and Federal Press Releases: 1999-2014, supra note 49. 
149 See supra note 41 and accompanying text. 
150 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Eight Indicted in Massive Mortgage Fraud 
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already distressed homeowners. 154 As was the case with mortgage fraud, 
lying behind most of these schemes were individuals flying solo or 
working together in small groups. For example, early in 2006 Illinois AG 
Lisa Madigan filed suit against a small company known as MarTav 
Services for a fraudulent practice known as "equity stripping."l55 In one 
instance, a victim of MarTav underwent open-heart surgery and had to 
quit her job, causing her to fall behind on her mortgage payments.ls6 
Facing foreclosure, she signed on with MarTav who told her she could 
pay a monthly rent check and get her home back in a year.ls? In fact, 
MarTav obtained title, took out a new mortgage greater than what was 
owed on the existing mortgage, and then later sold the house to a third 
party.1ss Although federal enforcers would later play a much more active 
role, 159 through 2008 the states were most active. In a December 2011 
press release announcing another mortgage fraud lawsuit, Madigan said 
her office was filing its 50th civil action and had issued 622 cease-and-
desist letters ordering rescue operations to stop illegally charging 
upfront payment for services.l6o 
In addition to these law enforcement actions against small-scale 
mortgage fraud and mortgage rescue fraud operations, the Enforcers 
were also laying the seeds for large-scale enforcement actions that would 
bear fruit after the onset of the Great Recession. One effort was the 
states' early response to the emerging foreclosure crisis and abuses by 
mortgage servicers through formation of the State Foreclosure 
Prevention Working Group.l61 In New York, Attorneys General Spitzer 
and later Cuomo 162 launched investigations into the role of the credit 
rating agencies that gave their highest marks to toxic residential 
mortgage-backed securities. And AG Coakley in Massachusetts 
investigated the securitization of subprime loans, an action that would 
later result in a series of enforcement actions based on harm to state 
pension funds and provide a roadmap for a larger state-federal 
response.l63 
154 See supra note 43 and accompanying text. 
155 Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Files 50th Suit Against Mortgage 'Rescue' Scheme, 
Leads Nation In Crackdown On Scams Targeting Distressed Homeowners (Dec. 19, 2011) 





159 Between 2000 and 2008 the Justice Department and FTC announced eight separate actions 
against mortgage rescue operations. See, e.g., Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Stops Bogus 
Mortgage Loan Modification Business (June 21, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/news-
even ts/press-releases/ 20 11 I 06/ftc -stops-bogus-mortgage-loan-modification-business. 
160 Press Release, 50th Suit, supra note 155. 
161 See infra notes 193-219 and accompanying text. 
162 See infra notes 280-84 and accompanying text. 
163 See infra notes 254-65 and accompanying text. 
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Lastly, the Enforcers played an advocacy role at the state and 
federal levels. Several of the AGs championed new laws to stop 
predatory lenders,164 protect homeowners in foreclosure,16s and target 
mortgage rescue schemes.166 And in the years leading up to the crisis, 
Iowa AG Tom Miller regularly sounded the warning alarm before 
congressional committees.167 
B. Act II: After the Fall (2009-2013) 
After peaking in 2006, the subprime mortgage market took a 
precipitous fall in 2007 that soon affected the credit markets, devastating 
the financial sector and eventually the broader economy.16s In 2007 the 
warning signs came one after another. In February, Freddie Mac 
announced it would no longer purchase the most risky subprime 
loans.169 New Century Financial, one of the largest subprime lenders, 
filed for bankruptcy a few months later. And by August Fitch Ratings 
was slashing its rating of Countrywide Financial-at that time the 
largest subprime lender in the business.17o By 2008 the major financial 
institutions were reeling. Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers, and 
164 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., Attorney General 
Martha Coakley Proposes New Consumer Protection Regulations (Aug. 7, 2007) (on file with 
author); Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Applauds House Passage of Bill to Combat 
Predatory Lending (May 30, 2003) (on file with author); Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, 
Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller Asks Lawmakers to Tackle Predatory Mortgage Lending (Feb. 13, 
2007), available at http:/ /www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/feb_2007 /pred_ 
lending.html. 
165 See, e.g., Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Announces Comprehensive Strategy to 
Address Looming Home Foreclosure Crisis in Illinois (Mar. 26, 2007), available at 
http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2007 _03/20070326b.html. 
166 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., Attorney General 
Martha Coakley Announces Public Hearing Date for Emergency Regulations Prohibiting 
Foreclosure Rescue Transactions and Foreclosure Related Services; Solicits Public Comment (July 
31, 2007) (on file with author); Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan, Lawmakers Take on 
Mortgage Foreclosure "Rescuers" (Jan. 30, 2006), available at 
http:/ /www.illinoisattorneygeneral.gov /pressroom/2006 _ 01/20060 130.html. 
167 See, e.g., Congressional Review of OCC Preemption: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on 
Oversight & Investigations of the House Comm. on Fin. Servs., 108th Cong. (2004) (statement of 
Tom Miller, Iowa Att'y Gen.); Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Iowa 
Attorney General Tom Miller Testimony on "Improving Federal Consumer Protection in 
Financial Services" (June 13, 2007) (testimony before U.S. House Committee on Financial 
Services); Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller Tells Congressional 
Committee of Predatory Lending Problems and Vows They Will Be a Main Priority of His Office 
(July 26, 2001). 
168 See generally FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 233-386; ENGEL & 
McCoY, supra note 12, at 99-121. 
169 See Vikas Bajaj, Freddie Mac Tightens Standards, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2007, at Cl. 
170 Julie Creswell & Vikas Bajaj, Home Lender Is Seeking Bankruptcy, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2007, 
at Cl. 
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Washington Mutual Bank disappeared altogether. 171 And on the theory 
of too-big-to fail, the federal government orchestrated a series of rescues 
for firms such as AIG, Citigroup, and Bank of America.m On Main 
Street, the fallout included wiped-out retirement savings, loss of 
employment, underwater mortgages, and foreclosures.m By the 
dramatic events of September 2008 the crisis was visible everywhere. 
The onset of the Great Recession brought some federal 
enforcement actions after years of slumber,l74 but the shift occurred 
with the changing of the guard at the White House in January 2009. To 
many state AGs, the most dramatic shift was the commitment by 
various federal agencies to partner with the states. In March 2009, 
Attorney General Eric Holder addressed forty-three state AGs at a 
National Association of Attorneys General (NAAG) meeting and called 
for state-federal collaboration, especially in response to the housing 
crisis.m And by summer 2009 a few state AGs-including Iowa 
Attorney General Tom Miller-were at the U.S. Department of Justice 
sitting across the table from top federal officials representing multiple 
agencies to discuss how they could collaborate.176 
This partnership emerged out of a shared mission, but it was also 
strengthened by relationships already in place: then-Senator Lisa 
Madigan was at one time the President's seatmate in the Illinois Senate, 
and AG Tom Miller had travelled with Obama by bus around the back 
roads of Iowa for months. Moreover, in building the team at the new 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Elizabeth Warren and later 
Director Richard Cordray-former Ohio Attorney General-would 
bring in many former state assistant attorneys general and state banking 
regulators who valued the vital role the Enforcers and other leading 
states had played and who had the relationships to strengthen state-
federal collaboration.m 
In November 2009, the President established the interagency 
Financial Fraud Enforcement Task force to coordinate enforcement 
171 See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 99-121. 
172 Id. 
173 FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, supra note 12, at 390-94. 
174 See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, More than 400 Defendants Charged for Roles 
in Mortgage Fraud Schemes as Part of Operation "Malicious Mortgage" (June 19, 2008), available 
at http:/ /www.justice.gov/ opa/pr/2008/J une/08-odag-551.html. 
175 Eric Holder, Jr., Att'y Gen., Remarks by Attorney General Eric Holder to the National 
Association of Attorneys General (Mar. 2, 2009), available at http:!/votesmart.org/public-
statement/412345/remarks-by-attorney-general-eric-holder-to-the-national-association-of-
attorneys-general# ("I think [responding to the housing crisis] is one area where, in particular, I 
think we can work together. You're going to know in your states perhaps better than we do at the 
federal level what's going on, have a better sense of how we might prioritize the limited resources 
that we all have."). 
176 Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, Assistant Att'y Gen., Iowa Att'y Gen.'s Office 
(Jan. 31, 2014). 
177 Id. 
1638 CARDOZO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:1611 
actions across the different agencies and with the states. 178 In addition, 
the first few years of the new administration witnessed extraordinary 
structural reforms with passage of the Dodd Frank Act and the creation 
of the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) in summer 
of 2010.179 Convinced that industry had captured the federal regulators 
who had the power to prevent the crisis, Congress created a single 
agency charged with the sole mission of protecting consumers in the 
financial marketplace and armed with new powers to achieve that 
task.1so New substantive rules governed mortgage lending,1s1 and 
Congress harnessed the forces of federalism by placing limits on agency 
preemption1s2 and empowering AGs to enforce federal consumer 
finance laws.1s3 
The Enforcers welcomed these changes. In fact, several played a 
significant role in bringing about the reforms. All five states were 
outspoken advocates for Title X of the Dodd Frank Act and creation of 
CFPB,1s4 with Attorneys General Lisa Madigan, Tom Miller, and their 
staff playing an especially important role behind the scenes.1ss They 
lobbied for limits on agency preemption, which had blocked so many of 
their efforts over the past decade,1s6 with Madigan making a personal 
appeal to the president to secure a last-minute victory.1s7 And they 
fought for concurrent enforcement powers to ensure consumers would 
always have a cop on the beat, even if the federal regulators were 
178 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, President Obama Establishes Interagency Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Nov. 17, 2009), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2009/ 
November/09-opa-1243.html; see also Exec. Order No. 13,519, 74 Fed. Reg. 60,123 (Nov. 17, 
2009), available at http:/ /www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/ executive-order-financial-fraud-
enforcement-task-force. 
179 See generally Michael B. Mierzewski et al., The Dodd-Frank Act Establishes the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection as the Primary Regulator of Consumer Financial Products and 
Services, 127 BANKING L.J. 722 (2010); Wilmarth, supra note 50, at 920-48. 
180 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, tit. X, 
124 Stat. 1376, 1955-2105 (2010). 
181 Id. § 1422, 124 Stat. at 2157. 
182 Id. § 1041(a)(1), 124 Stat. at 2011. 
183 Id.; see also Totten, supra note 52. 
184 See, e.g., Letter from Twenty-Three State Att'ys Gen. to Senators Dodd & Shelby and 
Representatives Frank & Bachus (Aug. 17, 2009); see also Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., 
Commonwealth of Mass., Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley Urges Congress to 
Support Legislation Creating the Federal Consumer Financial Protection Agency (Aug. 18, 2009), 
available at http:/ /www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ag-coakley-urges-
congress-to-support.html. 
185 See LARRY KIRSCH & ROBERT N. MAYER, FINANCIAL JuSTICE: THE PEOPLE'S CAMPAIGN TO 
STOP LENDER ABUSE 130-31 (2013). 
186 Letter from Nat'! Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. (signed by 38 AGs) to Senators Dodd & Shelby and 
Representatives Frank & Bachus (Nov. 4, 2009), available at http://agportal-
s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Home/News/Press_Releases/2009/Final%20 
Preemption%20with%20Signatures%20110409.pdf (regarding preemption of state laws). 
187 See KIRSCH & MAYER, supra note 185. 
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m1ssmg in action.1ss In the midst of Senate inaction, they called for 
confirmation of the agency's first Director, Rick Cordray-one of their 
own.1s9 While Ohio AG from 2009-2011, Cordray had witnessed 
firsthand the fallout of the economic crisis and during his few years in 
office helped lead the fight,l9o The Enforcers knew they needed a strong 
federal partner and were outspoken advocates for reform. 
Amidst these changes, the states continued to lead and in many 
ways shape the law enforcement agenda. At the same time, their focus 
shifted. They might have doubled-down on harms in the origination 
process and continued on the path cleared by the Household and 
Ameriquest cases with large, multistate cases. But they went a different 
direction. Many of those predatory and discriminatory lending cases 
they launched earlier continued toward settlement. And the smaller-
scale actions against persons engaged in mortgage fraud or mortgage 
rescue fraud came at a steady rate. But along with their new federal 
partners, their attention turned toward two new challenges: stopping 
abuses in the mortgage servicing and foreclosure business, and holding 
Wall Street accountable for fraud in the securitization of toxic 
mortgages. 
1. Servicing and Foreclosure Abuse 
The Enforcers and their other state partners led the response to 
abuses in the mortgage servicing industry. The culmination of their 
efforts was the February 2012 settlement with five of the nation's largest 
mortgage servicers.l91 The National Mortgage Settlement, valued at $25 
billion, was the second largest settlement ever reached by AGs. 192 The 
agreement was ultimately the joint effort of the states and their federal 
partners, but its roots went back nearly five years. 
The subprime lending frenzy that peaked in 2006-and the 
predatory schemes behind it-assured a foreclosure crisis when the 
housing bubble finally burst. Meeting in the summer of 2007 and very 
conscious of the crisis unfolding in their states, thirty-seven AGs and 
several state banking regulators formed the State Foreclosure Prevention 
188 Letter from Nat'! Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., supra note 186. 
189 Letter from Nat'! Ass'n of Att'ys Gen. (signed by 33 AGs) to Senate Majority Leader Harry 
Reid & Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (Oct. 18, 2011), available at 
http:/ I signon.s3.amazonaws.com/20 1110 18.signon.Cordray _Letter_ of_Support.pdf (regarding 
confirmation of Richard Cordray to head CFBP). 
190 See Michael Powell, The States v. Wall Street, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 12,2010, at Bl. 
191 See infra notes 223-52 and accompanying text. 
192 After tobacco, which was for $206 billion and was reached in 1998. See supra note 1. 
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Working Group.193 Eleven AGs joined the Executive Committee, 
including all five Enforcers.194 Leading the effort was Iowa AG Tom 
Miller,19s The Group was policy-focused and its goal was "to reduce the 
number of foreclosures by encouraging loan modifications and other 
sustainable, long-term solutions."196 
The State Working Group began in the Fall of 2007 by twice 
meeting with the top twenty subprime mortgage servicers, who 
collectively represented 93% of the nation's subprime loans.197 Miller 
and his colleagues expressed their concerns that the banks were 
proceeding with unnecessary foreclosures, which loss modification 
efforts might otherwise have avoided.19s Although the servicers' seemed 
to agree about what needed to happen, the AGs worried that the 
ground-level reality was far different. Lacking the information they 
needed to make firm assessments, the AGs launched a data-gathering 
effort to monitor the success of the servicers' foreclosure avoidance 
programs.199 Although several financial institutions agreed to cooperate, 
the Group's efforts were hampered when the large national banks 
refused, including JP Morgan and Wells Fargo. The AGs would later 
learn that OCC expressly advised the banks not to cooperate. zoo 
Although this lack of cooperation prevented the AGs from 
developing a full picture, they were still able to draw several conclusions 
in a series of reports issued between February 2008 and August 2010.201 
193 STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GRP., ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
SERVICING PERFORMANCE, DATA REPORT NO. 1, at 3 (2008) [hereinafter SERVICING 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 1], available at http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Documents/SFPWG/Data 
ReportFeb2008.pdf. 
194 Id. at 3 n.l. Other members included the AGs of Arizona, Colorado, Michigan, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Texas, along with the state banking regulator from New York and North 
Carolina. 
195 Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., States' Foreclosure Prevention 
Working Group Produces First Report on Mortgage Servicers' Loss-Mitigation Performance (Feb. 
7, 2008), available at http:/ /www.state.ia.us/government/ag/latest_news/releases/feb_2008/ 
Foreclosure_prevention.html. 
196 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 1, supra note 193, at 4. 
197 Id. 
198 Id. at 6. For explanations of the economics and incentives behind the decision to favor 
foreclosures over loan modifications, see Levitin & Twomey, supra note 23 and Patricia A. 
McCoy, Barriers to Foreclosure Prevention During the Financial Crisis, 55 ARIZ. L. REv. 723 
(2013). 
199 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 1, supra note 193, at 6. The Working Group sought 
input from both federal regulators and servicers to reduce reporting costs for the servicers. Id. 
2oo Letter from Deborah Hagan, Chief, Consumer Prot. Div., Office of the Ill. Att'y Gen., to the 
Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm'n (Apr. 27, 2010) (on file with author) (citing a letter that JP Morgan 
sent to the Working Group, where the bank says: "[w]e have consulted with the OCC and they 
have advised us that it would be inconsistent with the OCC's exclusive oversight and examination 
of a national bank for information of the kind required to complete the call report to be provided 
to officials other than the OCC"). 
201 The Working Group issued a total of five reports, which are available at 
http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Pages/SFPWG.aspx. 
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They found that between 60% and 80% of all seriously delinquent 
homeowners were not participating in any kind of loss mitigation 
program, such as a payment reduction plan.2o2 The numbers continued 
to affirm what several AGs had thought from the start: that the servicers 
were sending homeowners into foreclosure when they might have 
avoided that outcome through some loss mitigation measure. With each 
report the AGs continued their early call for "systematic, long-term 
solutions,"2o3 and proposed several specific steps including (1) stopping 
the process of "dual-tracking," whereby the servicers continued to 
foreclose on a property at the same time they pursued loss mitigation 
efforts; and (2) prioritizing principal reduction as a more sustainable 
and effective means ofloss mitigation.2o4 
The State Working Group expressed its ongoing concerns when it 
issued its fifth (and final) report in August 2010, but the report also 
sounded a positive note: the more recent loan modifications were 
performing better than earlier adjustments.zos This development was 
enough for Illinois AG Lisa Madigan to indicate that the most recent 
report gave "reasons to be optimistic."2o6 But any optimism vanished on 
Monday, September 20, 2010 when a major mortgage servicer, Ally 
Financial (formerly General Motors Acceptance Corporation, or 
GMAC), announced it was imposing a moratorium on foreclosures in 
the twenty-three states with judicial foreclosures.zo? The reason? 
Improprieties in the servicer's handling of the foreclosure process. The 
company was outed by one of its own: a mid-level manager named 
202 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 1, supra note 193, at 1; STATE FORECLOSURE 
PREVENTION WORKING GRP., ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE, 
DATA REPORT NO.2, at 1 (2008) [hereinafter SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 2], available at 
http:/ /www.csbs.org/regulatory/Documents/SFPW G/DataReportApr2008. pdf; STATE 
FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GRP., ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE SERVICING 
PERFORMANCE, DATA REPORT NO. 3, at 2 (2008) [hereinafter SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 
3], available at http:/ /www.csbs.org/regulatory/Documents/SFPWG/DataReportSep2008.pdf; 
STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GRP., ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME MORTGAGE 
SERVICING PERFORMANCE, DATA REPORT NO. 4, at 2 (2010) [hereinafter SERVICING 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 4], available at http://www.csbs.org/regulatory/Documents/SFPWG/Data 
ReportJan2010.pdf; STATE FORECLOSURE PREVENTION WORKING GRP., ANALYSIS OF SUBPRIME 
MORTGAGE SERVICING PERFORMANCE, DATA REPORT NO. 5, at 1 (2010) [hereinafter SERVICING 
PERFORMANCE REPORT 5], available at http:/ /www.csbs.org/regulatory/Documents/SFPWG/Data 
ReportAug20 10. pdf. 
203 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 1, supra note 193, at 2. 
204 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 4, supra note 202, at 3. 
205 SERVICING PERFORMANCE REPORT 5, supra note 202, at 1. 
206 Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Success Rate of Loan Modifications Improving, Say Attorney 
General Madigan and Foreclosure Prevention Working Group (Aug. 24, 2010), available at 
http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/20 10 _ 08/201 00824.html. 
207 David Streitfeld, GMAC Halts Foreclosures in 23 States for Review, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 
2010, at B4; Denise Pellegrini & Dakin Campbell, Ally's GMAC Mortgage Halts Evictions Across 23 
States, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 20, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-09-20/gmac-
mortgage-halts-home-foreclosures-in-23-states-including-florida-n -y-. 
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Jeffrey Stephan who testified in various depositions that he was signing 
as many as 10,000 affidavits a month with no personal knowledge about 
the truth of the claims, as state laws required.zos Although the term was 
not yet a household name, Stephan was what the industry had already 
dubbed a "robo-signer." 
Individual AGs responded swiftly, with AG Jerry Brown calling on 
Ally to extend its moratorium to California (a nonjudicial foreclosure 
state);zo9 Illinois AG Lisa Madigan demanding a meeting with Ally 
officials;21o and Iowa AG Tom Miller launching a civil investigation.m 
But Ally was just the beginning. Nine days later, JPMorgan announced 
it was halting more than 56,000 foreclosures for the same reasons.m 
Bank of America soon followed. 213 The entire mortgage servicing 
system, it seemed, was compromised. 
The cadre of assistant attorneys general who had worked these 
cases for years-some going all the way back to FAMCO-sensed 
immediately that these failures were colossai.214 But the scope of their 
authority to address these harms was uncertain.21s The major servicers, 
after all, were all national banks. Were the states preempted? Dodd-
Frank had become law that past summer, but its anti-preemption 
provisions were untested and OCC had already issued proposed rules 
that attempted to leave its preemption policy nearly intact.z16 And how 
would the servicers react? The banks had been unwilling even to provide 
data to the AG's Working Group in the past. 
But the world looked different in 2010 than it did in 2007. Not only 
did the passage of Dodd-Frank alter the regulatory environment, but the 
robo-signing fiasco and the role of the states in responding to that crisis 
also grabbed the attention of the national media to a degree that had 
never happened in the prior cases.m Fairly quickly, the major banks 
208 Streitfeld, supra note 207. 
209 Press Release, State of Cal. Dep't ofJustice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Brown Directs Nation's 
Fourth Largest Home Lender to Suspend Foreclosures Until It Proves It Is Complying with the 
Law (Sept. 24, 2010), available at http://oag.ca.gov/news/press-releases/brown-directs-nations-
fourth -largest -home-lender-suspend-foreclosures-until-it. 
21o Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Attorney General Madigan Demands Meeting with Mortgage 
Lender at Center of Foreclosure Controversy (Sept. 24, 2010), available at 
http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/20 10 _ 09/201 00924.html. 
211 Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller Launches Ally/GMAC 
Foreclosure Probe (Sept. 24, 2010). 
212 David Streitfeld, ]PM organ Suspending Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30,2010, at Bl. 
213 David Streitfeld, 3rd Lender Will Freeze Foreclosures in the Courts, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 2010, 
atBl. 
214 Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
21s Id. 
216 Dodd-Frank Act Implementation, 76 Fed. Reg. 30,557-01 (May 26, 2001) (codified at 12 
C.P.R. pts. 4, 5, 7, 8, 28, 34). 
217 See Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
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would engage and join the states at the negotiating table. 218 Even though 
the preemption issues remained formally untested in court, in a sense 
the course of events answered that question and the state AGs would 
leave this episode with more power than when they entered. 
In mid-October all fifty AGs announced a joint investigation of the 
mortgage servicing industry.219 A fifty-state action has precedent, but is 
nonetheless rare. And yet the coalition formed with ease.22o Although 
the Working Group had been a policy project, it provided the 
infrastructure for legal action. Iowa AG Tom Miller again led the 
effort,m and California, Illinois, and New York joined the Executive 
Committee, among other leading states. 222 
Later in October, word leaked that the federal government was also 
launching a probe. 223 By then a few of the leading states and federal 
officials were in conversations about working together,224 The potential 
for a state-federal partnership on this issue was not immediately 
apparent. The alleged wrongs were matters of state law, which governs 
the foreclosure process, in the first instance. But the allegations gave rise 
to potential federal liability as well-both for regulatory failures and 
potential civil or criminal prosecution.22s The states had some reason to 
be distrustful, given the past decade. With Iowa taking the lead, 
however, the states and the federal government soon joined hands, 
turning a multistate action into a multigovernment action. The 
partnership broke new ground. The states and the feds had worked 
together in the past on antitrust litigation.226 Moreover, the more-
independent FTC and the states had a history of coordinating in cases 
such as FAMC0.227 But the national mortgage settlement was the first 
consumer protection, multigovernmental action where the states not 
only had a federal partner, but also collaborated with agencies across the 
federal government: in this instance, the Department of Justice, The 
Department of Housing and Urban Development, the new Consumer 
218 See id. 
219 Press Release, Nat'! Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., 50 States Sign Mortgage Foreclosure Joint 
Statement (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.naag.org/joint-statement-of-the-mortgage-
foreclosure-multistate-group.php. 
22o See Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
221 Andrew Martin, Foreclosures Spur Action from U.S. and States, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 2010, 
atB9. 
222 Press Release, supra note 219. 
223 Zachary A. Goldfarb, U.S. Probe Targeting Foreclosure Documents, WASH. POST, Oct. 20, 
2010, at Al. 
224 See Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
225 Federal regulation of mortgage servicing was light. See Levitin & Twomey, supra note 23, at 
52 ("There is little regulation or monitoring of servicers," but possible avenues included claims 
made to the federal housing agencies that insured residential mortgages; securities violations in 
the representations made to investors; and mail and wire fraud in the filing of false paperwork.). 
226 See infra note 370. 
227 See supra notes 53-70 and accompanying text. 
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Financial Protection Bureau, the Treasury Department, the banking 
regulators, and others.22s This level of collaboration was unprecedented. 
Holding together fifty AGs-most of whom are elected 
politicians-was a challenge. From the start, the states and the feds had 
broad agreement that they did not just want to levy a fine on the banks 
and walk away; they wanted structural reforms that would help 
struggling homeowners. As AG Miller commented, "[w]hat we're really 
trying to do is change a dysfunctional system."229 At the center of this 
effort was loan modification, which many of the AGs had called for 
from the early days of the State Foreclosure Prevention Working 
Group.z3o On the details, however, the principals did not all agree. 
Federal banking regulators, as well as some states, were opposed to 
principal reductions. 231 Early on the banks also took a firm stand against 
this proposal, claiming moral hazard. Asked about whether he would 
consider this option, JP Morgan CEO Jamie Dimon had told reporters: 
"Yeah, that's off the table."m Moreover, the states also disagreed about 
how to structure a loan modification program and the size of civil 
penalties. 233 And a few states that claimed the deal was not tough 
enough walked away or threatened to walk away, although they 
eventually returned.z34 
In what some critics saw as an attempt to undermine the state-
federal investigation and give the banks political cover,235 the banking 
regulators announced in April 2011 that they had reached consent 
agreements with the fourteen largest servicers.236 Although some of the 
terms in the agreements were on AG Miller's agenda, such as a 
prohibition on "dual tracking" whereby a bank would consider a loan 
228 See Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
229 Dennis Brady & Dina ElBoghdady, Mortgage Servicers Under Scrutiny for Abuses, WASH. 
POST, Mar. 8, 2011, at AlO. 
230 See supra note 196 and accompanying text. 
231 David Streitfeld, Servicers Said to Agree to Revamp Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 2011, at 
B4. 
232 David Streitfeld, In Foreclosure Settlement Talks with Banks, Predictions of a Long Process, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,2011, at BS. 
233 Brady & ElBoghdady, supra note 229; Streitfeld, supra note 232. 
234 See Alejandro Lazo & Nathaniel Popper, State Exits Settlement Deal Talks, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 
1, 2011, at B1; Louise Story, California Leaves Talks in Settling Mortgages, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 
2011, at Bl. 
235 David Streitfeld, New Rules for Top Mortgage Servicers Face Early Criticism, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 11, 2011, at B3 (quoting Professor Adam Levitin, who called the agreements a "sham 
settlement"). 
236 David Streitfeld, Rules for Mortgage Servicers Are Criticized as Ineffective, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 
13, 2011, at B4; David Streitfeld, supra note 231; Press Release, Bd. of Governors of the Fed. 
Reserve Sys., 2011 Enforcement Actions (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.federalreserve.gov /newsevents/press/ enforcement/20 11 0413a.htm; Press Release, 
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, OCC Takes Enforcement Action Against Eight 
Servicers for Unsafe and Unsound Foreclosure Practice (Apr. 13, 2011), available at 
http:/ /www.occ.gov/news-issuances/news-releases/20 11/nr-occ-20 11-47.html. 
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modification at the same time as it was proceeding with a foreclosure, 
Miller was not surprised to see that the central term was missing: 
mandatory loan modifications to prevent unnecessary foreclosures.m 
Moreover, the agreements raised questions about enforcement and 
whether the regulators were leaving the banks to police themselves.z3s 
After more than a year of negotiations and numerous missed 
deadlines, the parties finally came to terms in early February 2012.239 
The settlement was wide-ranging and included new mortgage servicing 
standards.z4o Among other standards, banks could foreclose only after 
reviewing loss mitigation options, and had to follow clear procedures.241 
The new standards went further than both what the federal banking 
agencies had put in place, and any other existing provisions at the time 
in state or federallaw.z42 The agreement also included about $20 billion 
toward borrower relief: principal reduction in the case of delinquency or 
near-delinquency; refinancing for underwater mortgages; and other 
forms of relief such as short sales and anti -blight programs.243 
The agreement also came with compliance provisions.244 Several of 
the states had openly worried that the earlier settlement with 
Countrywide for predatory lending did not include sufficient 
oversight_24s The National Mortgage Settlement identified clear 
deadlines for when the servicers had to fulfill their obligations and 
created an enforcement administrator empowered to review compliance 
and impose penalties.246 Moreover, as mentioned, the agreement did not 
grant broad immunity to the banks. The law enforcement parties were 
237 Dina ElBoghdady, A Deal on Foreclosure Practices, WASH. POST, Apr. 14, 2011, at A14; 
Streitfeld, supra note 235. 
238 Streitfeld, supra note 236. 
239 Dennis Brady & Sari Horwitz, Foreclosure Fraud Talks Close to Deal, WASH. POST, Feb. 9, 
2012, at A12; Alejandro Lazo, Foreclosure Aid Deal Near Completion, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 9., 2012, at 
AA1; Nelson D. Schwartz & Shaila Dewan, $26 Billion Deal is Said to Be Set for Homeowners, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 9, 2012, at A1; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Federal Government and State 
Attorneys General Reach $25 Billion Agreement with Five Largest Mortgage Servicers to Address 
Mortgage Loan Servicing and Foreclosure Abuses (Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter Press Release, $25 
Billion Agreement], available at http:/ /www.justice.gov/opa/pr/20 12/February/12-ag-186.html; 
Press Release, Iowa Dep't of Justice, Office of the Att'y Gen., Miller Announces $25 Billion Joint 
State-Federal Mortgage Servicing Settlement on Foreclosure Wrongs (Feb. 9, 2012) [hereinafter 
Press Release, Miller Announces Joint Settlement]. 
240 For the primary documents, see JOINT ST.-FED. NAT'L MORTGAGE SERVICING 
SETTLEMENTS, http://www.nationalmortgagesettlement.com (last visited Apr. 26, 2015). For a 
detailed overview of the terms, see Robert E. Bostrom et al., Final Agreement Filed in Attorneys 
General $25 Billion Settlement with Servicers, 66 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 130 (2012). 
241 Press Release, $25 Billion Agreement, supra note 239. 
242 See Bostrom et al., supra note 240, at 131. 
243 Press Release, $25 Billion Agreement, supra note 239. 
244 For an overview, see Bostrom et al., supra note 240, at 132-33. 
245 Shaila Dewan & Nelson D. Schwartz, Deal is Closer for a U.S. Plan On Mortgages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 6, 2012, at A1; Alejandro Lazo & Jim Puzzanghera, State Shuns Bank Deal, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 7, 2012, at Bl. 
246 Press Release, $25 Billion Agreement, supra note 239. 
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still free to pursue criminal actions related to mortgage servicing, civil or 
criminal suits related to securitization, and individual borrowers could 
still file claims.z47 
The agreement was not without its weaknesses. Most glaring, 
mortgages owned by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were not covered.z4s 
Although the settlement set records for the amount, it was still a drop in 
the bucket. Underwater mortgages at the time were estimated to equal 
about $750 billion in negative equity.z49 And the servicing standards 
only applied to the five large servicers party to the settlement, although 
they covered about fifty- five percent of the market,2so But the settlement 
was also remarkable in a few ways. As AG Miller said: "One of the 
hardest battles I fought over the last 16 months was over principal 
reduction ..... At first the banks tried to tell us that was a nonstarter. 
We kept fighting back, and now I'm very proud to say that we got it 
across the finish line."251 Moreover, the limited immunity was also a 
win. As Madigan said, the settlement "is neither the beginning nor the 
end of our work to hold banks and other institutions accountable."252 
2. Securitization Fraud 
The final area where the Enforcers acted was fraud in the 
securitization of predatory loans that in many ways fueled the mortgage 
meltdown.2s3 Starting in late 2007,254 Massachusetts AG Martha Coakley 
launched the first and most comprehensive challenge to the investment 
banks that financed the subprime boom. Although it is now common 
wisdom that Wall Street was closely tied to the subprime mortgage 
crisis, the connection was not widely discussed at the time. 
247 Id. 
248 Schwartz & Dewan, supra note 239. The Federal Housing Financial Agency, which 
regulates Fannie and Freddie, supported the decision out of moral hazard concerns. Press Release, 
Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, Statement by Edward J. DeMarco, Acting Director, FHFA, on the Use of 
Principal Forgiveness by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (July 31, 2012), available at 
http:/ /www.fhfa.gov/Media/PublicAffairs/Pages/Statement -by-Edward-J-DeMarco-Acting-
Director-FHF A -on-the-Use-of-Principal-Forgiveness-by-Fannie-Mae-and-Freddie-Ma.aspx. 
249 Dennis Brady & Sari Horwitz, Settlement Launches Foreclosure Reckoning, WASH. POST, 
Feb. 10,2012, at Al. 
250 Bostrom et al., supra note 240, at 131. 
251 Press Release, Miller Announces Joint Settlement, supra note 239. The number of servicers 
would later grow, including the December 2013 settlement with Ocwen Financial. See Nathaniel 
Popper, Big Subprime Mortgage Loan Servicer Agrees to $2.2 Billion Settlement, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 
20,2013, at B8. 
252 Brady & Horwitz, supra note 249. 
253 See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text. 
254 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., Attorney General Martha 
Coakley & Goldman Sachs Reach Settlement Regarding Subprime Lending Issues (May 11, 2009), 
available at http:/ /www.mass.gov I ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/2009/ attorney-general-
martha -coakley -and -goldman.html. 
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Massachusetts made an early and deliberate choice to focus limited 
enforcement resources on securitization. As we will see, in the larger 
enforcement picture across the fifty states, this decision yielded benefits 
that went well past state borders: Massachusetts led enforcement efforts 
in a critical and complex area of the crisis where few other states had 
gone. The state also led in the face of federal inaction: when Coakley 
began her efforts, the SEC had not brought any major claims against the 
large investment banks for fraud related to RMBSs.zss From 2009 
through 2013, Coakley settled claims against many of the largest 
institutions: Goldman Sachs ($60 million);zs6 Morgan Stanley ($102 
million);257 Royal Bank of Scotland ($52 million);zss Barclays ($36 
million);zs9 J.P. Morgan ($34 million);z6o and Countrywide Securities 
($17 million).261 
Coakley's case against Morgan Stanley is representative.262 The firm 
was a financer for New Century Financial Corporation, a major 
subprime lender in the years before the collapse. Coakley's investigation 
alleged two types of wrongdoing: ( 1) the firm provided a steady stream 
of funding for New Century to originate loans that Morgan Stanley 
knew were designed to fail and generate profits off fees and possible 
refinancing; and (2) the firm would then purchase these loans from New 
Century, place them into a securitization pool, and sell investments 
255 Press Release, Sec. & Exch. Comm'n, SEC Actions During Turmoil in Credit Markets (Jan. 
22, 2009), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/sec-actions.htm. 
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AG Coakley's Office (Nov. 28, 2011), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/ 
press-releases/20 11/2011-11-28-rbs-settlement.html; see also Jenifer B. McKim, Bank Settles 
Subprime Loans Case for $52m, Bos. GLOBE, Nov. 29,2011, at BS. 
259 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., Barclays to Pay $36.1 
Million for Securitization Role in Subprime Mortgage Meltdown (Sept. 9, 2013), available at 
http:/ /www.mass.gov/ ago/news-and -updates/press-releases/20 13/2013-09-09-barclays-aod.html; 
see also Deirdre Fernandes, Barclays Settles with AG for $36.1m, Bos. GLOBE, Sept. 10,2013, at B6. 
260 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., JPMorgan to Pay $13 
Billion in Federal-State Deal over Mortgage Backed Securities (Nov. 19, 2013), available at 
http:/ /www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-releases/20 13/20 13-11-19-jpmorgan-
settlement.html; see infra notes 275-76 and accompanying text. 
261 Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., AG Coakley Announces 
$11 Million Payment to State Pension Fund from Settlement with Countrywide Securities 
Corporation (Dec. 30, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-updates/press-
releases/20 13/20 13-12-30-countrywide-settlement.html; see also Countrywide Settlement to Give 
Mass. Fund $11m Boost, Bos. GLOBE, Dec. 31,2013, at B7. 
262 See supra note 257. 
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backed by the pool, knowing the securities did not meet its underwriting 
standards and otherwise violated state law.z63 Coakley alleged that the 
investment bank's actions harmed homeowners, investors, and the state 
through its two pension funds.264 The settlement included direct relief 
for homeowners in the form of loan modifications, a sizable payment to 
the state pension fund, and a fine payable to the Commonwealth.26s 
With Coakley's success, the question was whether other states and 
especially the federal government would support a larger investigation 
that went beyond the boundaries of one state. The question was 
answered in the State of the Union Address on Tuesday, January 24, 
2012,266 when the President announced a new unit within the Financial 
Fraud Enforcement Task Force that would investigate the financing of 
the subprime lending industry-the RMBS Working Group.267 The 
President appointed New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman as 
one of the co-chairs.z6s 
From a resource perspective the state-federal partnership was 
promising.z69 Schneiderman had fifteen attorneys focused on the issue 
in his office. 270 Now he would coordinate not only with other states, but 
also with various federal agencies that would contribute fifty-five 
attorneys, agents, and analysts.m Moreover, the states and the federal 
government each brought different strengths. Having the IRS on the 
team allowed investigation of possible tax violations. At the same time, 
New York had the Martin Act,m granting broad subpoena powers 
and-unlike federal securities law-allowing the AG to establish fraud 
263 Press Release, supra note 257. 
264 Id. 
265 Id. 
266 Barack Obama, President of the U.S., Remarks by the President in State of the Union 
Address (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/01/24/ 
remarks-president -state-union -address. 
267 Jim Puzzanghera, New Initiative Will Coordinate Probes of Mortgage Meltdown, L.A. TIMES, 
Jan. 27, 2012, http:/ /articles.latimes.com/20 12/jan/27 /business/la-fi-mortgage-working-group-
20120127; Edward Wyatt & Shaila Dewan, New Housing Task Force Will Zero in on Wall Street, 
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 25, 2012, at B1; Memorandum from Eric Holder, Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, to the Fin. Fraud Enforcement Task Force (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http:/ /www.justice.gov/ag/residential-mortgage-backed-securities.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, U.S. Attorney General Holder, State and Federal Officials Announce Collaboration to 
Investigate Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Market (Jan. 27, 2012), available at 
http:/ /www.justice.gov I opa/pr/20 12/J anuary I 12-ag-120.html. 
268 Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., A. G. Schneiderman and Federal Officials 
Detail Joint Investigation into Mortgage Crisis (Jan. 27, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/ 
press-release/ ag -Schneiderman-and-federal-officials-detail-joint-investigation-mortgage-crisis. 
269 But see Phil Angelides, Op-Ed., Will Wall Street Ever Face Justice?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 
2012, at A25 (Angelides co-chaired the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission). 
270 Harold Meyerson, Op-Ed., Holding the Banks Accountable, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2012, 
http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/ opinions/ eric-schneiderman-new-york -ag-shaped-drive-to-
hold-banks-accountable/20 12/0 1/30/gi QAjW xCgQ_story.html. 
271 Press Release, supra note 267. 
272 N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW§§ 352-359h (Consol. 2014). 
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without a showing of intent. 273 And the New York and Delaware AGs 
had power under state law over the trusts that held the pooled 
mortgages and issued the mortgage-backed securities.274 
Schneiderman and his other state and federal partners announced 
their first legal action in October 2012: a suit against JPMorgan for 
fraudulent misrepresentations and omissions to investors in the 
creation, packaging, and sale of RMBS.z7s The firm misled investors, the 
suit claimed, about the quality of the underlying loans. The charges were 
for actions committed by Bear Stearns, which JP Morgan absorbed in 
2008. A year later JPMorgan settled for $13 billion.276 The settlement 
was unique in that it included an express admission of wrongdoing by 
JPMorgan. 277 In the wake of this action, the enforcement team later 
reached settlements with Bank of Americaz7s and Citigroup279 based on 
similar accusations of wrongdoing. 
The investment banks were not the only targets in the world of 
subprime finance. The Enforcers also targeted the credit rating agencies, 
which assessed the risk of RMBSs and through 2007 were handing out 
273 DANIEL J. FETTERMAN & MARK P. GOODMAN, DEFENDING CORPORATIONS AND 
INDIVIDUALS IN GOVERNMENT INVESTIGATIONS §§ 9:8-9:13 (2012) (overview of Martin Act); 
Frank C. Razzano, Essay, The Martin Act: An Overview, 1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 125 (2006); Nicholas 
Thompson, The Sword of Spitzer, LEGAL AFF., May-June 2004, at 50. 
274 Alison Frankel, Pauley's BaJA MBS Ruling is Boon to New York, Delaware AGs, REUTERS, 
Oct. 25, 2011, available at http:/!blogs.reuters.com/alison-frankel/2011/10/25/pauleys-bofa-mbs-
ruling-is-boon-to-new-york -delaware-ags. 
275 Gretchen Morgenson, JPMorgan Unit Is Sued over Mortgage Pools, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 
2012, at B1; Michael Virtanen, Clock Runs out for Felony Charges in Mortgage-Securities 
Meltdown, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2012, at A13; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., 
A. G. Schneiderman Sues JPMorgan for Fraudulent Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Issued 
by Bear Stearns (Oct. 2, 2012), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
sues-jpmorgan-fraudulent-residential-mortgage-backed -securities-issued; Press Release, U.S. 
Dep't of Justice, Residential Mortgage-Backed Securities Working Group Members Announce 
First Legal Action (Oct. 2, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2012/0ctober/12-
opa-1196.html. 
276 Andrew R. Johnson, In Wake of Bank Pact, a Template Emerges, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,2013, 
at C7; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Ben Protess, JPMorgan Reveals How It Formed Mortgages, N.Y. 
TIMES, Nov. 20, 2013, at B1; Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., A.G. 
Schneiderman-led State & Federal Working Group Announces $13 Billion Settlement with 
JPMorgan Chase (Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-
led-state-federal-working-group-announces-13-billion-settlement; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of 
Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure Record $13 Billion Global 
Settlement with JPMorgan for Misleading Investors About Securities Containing Toxic Mortgages 
(Nov. 19, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2013/November/13-ag-1237.html. 
277 See supra note 2 7 6. 
278 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Bank of America to Pay $16.65 Billion in Historic 
Justice Department Settlement for Financial Fraud Leading up to and During the Financial Crisis 
(Aug. 21, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/bank-america-pay-1665-billion-
historic-justice-department -settlement-financial-fraud-leading. 
279 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department, Federal and State Partners Secure 
Record $7 Billion Global Settlement with Citigroup for Misleading Investors About Securities 
Containing Toxic Mortgages (July 14, 2014), available at http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-
department-federal-and -state-partners-secure-record-7-billion -global-settlement. 
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their highest rating to investments that proved toxic. Although it did 
not result in any enforcement actions, New York AG Eliot Spitzer 
launched an investigation into Moody's practices in 2005.280 His 
successor, Andrew Cuomo, continued the probe and in the summer of 
2008 announced agreements with the three primary rating agencies: 
Standard & Poor's, Moody's, and Fitch.281 Among other reforms, the 
agencies agreed to change their compensation system. For years critics 
had argued that the rating agencies had a fundamental conflict of 
interest: they are paid by the firms whose securities they rate, allowing 
the arrangers to negotiate the ratings.282 In settling with Cuomo, the 
agencies agreed to accept a fee-for-services model whereby they would 
be paid for a proposal regardless of final selection.283 Although the 
settlements marked significant reforms, critics raised concerns. 284 The 
fundamental conflict of interest that arose because the investment banks 
paid the ratings agencies still existed. Moreover, the settlements were 
prospective and did not hold the agencies accountable for their role in 
the mortgage meltdown. 
In the next few years, several states sought accountability. 
Connecticut led the way with a suit against Moody's and Standard & 
Poor's (S&P) in 2010.285 Illinois followed in January 2012 with a suit 
against S&P in state court.286 Madigan charged that the firm 
misrepresented itself as independent and objective in violation of the 
state's consumer protection law. As an important test case, Madigan's 
suit caught the attention of onlookers when it survived a motion to 
280 Eric Dash & Jenny Anderson, Attorney General Investigates Moody's Credit Rating Polices 
[sic}, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2005, at C3. 
281 Aaron Lucchetti, Big Credit-Rating Firms Agree to Reforms, WALL ST. J., June 6, 2008, at C3; 
Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Announces Landmark 
Reform Agreements with the Nation's Three Principal Credit Rating Agencies (June 5, 2008), 
available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/attorney-general-cuomo-announces-landmark-
reform-agreements-nations-three-principal. 
282 See, e.g., Nan S. Ellis et al., Conflicts of Interest in the Credit Rating Industry After Dodd-
Frank: Continued Business As Usual?, 7 VA. L. & Bus. REv. 1, 6-11 (2012). 
283 Press Release, supra note 281. 
284 See, e.g., Jenny Anderson & Vikas Bajaj, Rating Firms Seem Near Legal Deal on Reforms, 
N.Y. TIMES, June 4, 2008, at C1; Tomoeh Murakami Tse, Rating Agencies Agree to Changes, 
WASH. POST, June 6, 2008, at D2. 
285 Chad Bray, Connecticut Sues Raters Moody's and S&P, WALL ST. J., Mar. 11, 2010, at C6; 
Walden Siew, Connecticut Sues Moody's, S&P for "Tainted" Ratings, REUTERS, Mar. 10, 2010, 
available at http:/ /www.reuters.com/ article/20 10/03/1 0/ratings-connecticut -blumenthal-idUSN 
1013603420 100310; Press Release, State of Conn. Office of the Att'y Gen., Attorney General Sues 
Credit Rating Agencies for Illegally Giving Municipalities Lower Ratings, Costing Taxpayers 
Millions (July 30, 2008), available at http://www.ct.gov/ag/cwp/view.asp?A=2795&Q=420390. 
286 Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., Madigan Sues Standard & Poor's for Enabling Financial 
Meltdown (Jan. 25, 2012), available at http:l/illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/2012_01/2012 
0125.html. 
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dismiss in November 2012.287 The agency had argued that federal 
regulation preempted the suit and that the ratings were opinions 
protected by the First Amendment. The court rejected both arguments. 
With the Connecticut and Illinois cases moving forward, a broader 
state-federal coalition followed. In February 2013, the Justice 
Department and a dozen other states announced similar actions.zss AG 
Holder was flanked by his counterparts from California, Illinois, Iowa, 
and elsewhere for the announcement.zs9 The media reported that the 
federal government decided to move after talks broke down, with S&P 
refusing to pay a $1 billion penalty and admit wrongdoing.z9o The 
Federal litigants argued that S&P engaged in a scheme to defraud 
investors through RMBSs and that the firm falsely represented its 
independence, all in violation of the Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery, and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).291 Following the lead of 
Connecticut and Illinois, the state cases argued that S&P' s actions 
violated the various state consumer protection laws.zn 
III. WHAT THE STORY TELLS Us 
This narrative demonstrates why states are integral to the task of 
consumer financial protection, and how states might partner with each 
other and the federal government to achieve this end. The states not 
only serve as a stopgap when federal regulators fail to act, but also alter 
the quality of enforcement in positive ways not replicated by their 
federal counterparts. Moreover, these events suggest a new enforcement 
model in the area of consumer protection that may prove more potent 
and efficient than earlier approaches: the multigovernment, multiagency 
action. While these observations concern the substance of consumer 
287 See Alison Frankel & Ted Botha, Illinois S&P Suit: Bad Omen for Rating Agencies?, CHI. 
TRIB., Nov. 8, 2012, http:/ I articles.chicagotribune.com/20 12-11-08/news/ sns-rt-ratingsagency-
lawsuits-column-20121108 _1_standard-poor-s-actual-ratings-agencies. 
288 Andrew Ross Sorkin & Mary Williams Walsh, U.S. Accuses S.&P. of Fraud in Suit on Loan 
Bundles, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2013, at A1; Jia Lynn Yang, U.S. Suit Accuses S&P of Fraud, WASH. 
POST, Feb. 5, 2013, http:/ /www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/federal-lawsuit-accuses-
sandp-of-defrauding-investors/20 13/02/05/ae63e 1 Oe-6fa5-11 e2-ac36-3d8d9dcaa2e2_story.html; 
Press Release, supra note 45. 
289 See Press Release, supra note 45. 
290 Sorkin & Williams, supra note 288. 
291 See Press Release, supra note 45; see also Complaint for Civil Money Penalties and Demand 
for Jury Trial, United States v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CV13-00779 (C.D. Cal. Feb. 4, 2013), 
available at http:/ /www.justice.gov /iso/ opa/resources/ 8492013251 04924250796.PD F. 
292 See, e.g., Complaint for Treble Damages, Civil Penalties and Permanent Injunction for 
Violation of the California False Claims Act, Unfair Competition Law, and False Advertising Law, 
People v. McGraw-Hill Cos., No. CGC 13-528491 (Cal. Sup. Ct. Feb. 5, 2013) [hereinafter 
Complaint, People v. McGraw-Hill Cos.], available at http:/ /oag.ca.gov/system/files/attachments/ 
press_releases/S%26P%20complaint.pdf. 
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financial protection in the first instance, they also have implications for 
ongoing conversations about federalism and enforcement,293 
A. Why States Matter 
The states' role surrounding the economic cns1s was 
unprecedented. The AGs' focus on consumer protection was not new. 
Consumer protection has been a key responsibility of AGs since at least 
the 1960s. 294 Moreover, interstate cooperation against national threats 
was also not new. For at least three decades now AGs have collaborated 
to enforce the law against large institutions.z9s The most well-known 
example is the tobacco litigation which resulted in a $206 billion 
settlement in 1998.296 But what lacked precedent was the breadth of the 
AGs' response. In the tobacco case, the targets were a handful of major 
companies. By contrast, here the targets were participants in an industry 
that reached from Main Street to Wall Street. The offenders were 
individuals who ran fly-by-night scam operations, as well as major 
financial institutions bearing the names of giants in the industry. They 
were brokers, real estate agents, appraisers, lawyers, state and federal 
depositories, nondepository lenders, mortgage rescue operators, loan 
servicers, investment bankers, and credit raters, among others. At every 
level and against all seven deadly sins, the Enforcers and their allies were 
active throughout an entire sector of the economy. 
Not only was the states' role unprecedented, but it was also vital. As 
Illinois AG Lisa Madigan testified before the Financial Crisis Inquiry 
Commission, "[w]e must recognize that a dual state-federal regulatory 
regime ... is vital to the health of our economy."297 State AGs played a 
293 See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional 
Design, 89 TEX. L. REv. 15 (2010); Margaret H. Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: 
Representative Suits by State Attorneys General, 126 HARV. L. REv. 486 (2012); Margaret H. Lemos 
& Max Minzner, For-Profit Public Enforcement, 127 HARV. L. REv. 853 (2014); Margaret H. 
Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, 86 N.Y.U. L. REv. 698 (2011); Amanda M. Rose, State 
Enforcement of National Policy: A Contextual Approach (with Evidence from the Securities Realm), 
97 MINN. L. REv. 1343 (2013); Amy Widman, Advancing Federalism Concerns in Administrative 
Law Through a Revitalization of State Enforcement Powers: A Case Study of the Consumer Product 
Safety and Improvement Act of 2008, 29 YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 165 (2010); Amy Widman & 
Prentiss Cox, State Attorneys General's Use of Concurrent Public Enforcement Authority in Federal 
Consumer Protection Laws, 33 CARDOZO L. REv. 53 (2011). 
294 NAT'L Ass'N OF ATT'YS GEN., REPORT ON THE OFFICE OF ATTORNEY GENERAL 395-96 
(1971). During the 1960s, Michigan Attorney General Frank Kelley established the first Consumer 
Protection Division in the office of a state attorney general. See FRANK J. KELLEY & JACK 
LESSENBERRY, THE PEOPLE'S LAWYER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF FRANK J. KELLEY, THE NATION'S 
LONGEST-SERVING ATTORNEY GENERAL (forthcoming Sept. 2015). 
295 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES 244-45 (Emily Myers & 
Lynne Ross eds., 2d ed. 2007). 
296 See supra note 1. 
297 Madigan Testimony, supra note 61, at 12. 
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critical role on both the first and second lines of defense. At a minimum, 
the states functioned as a stopgap. In Act I the AGs filled an 
enforcement breach when federal regulators failed to act. Their powers 
were limited-because of agency preemption in the early years the states 
could not confront some of the greatest abuses. And in the end they did 
not prevent the economic crisis. They were not a failsafe. That the 
Enforcers did not halt the crisis, however, does not lessen their 
contribution-sounding the alarm, mitigating harms, providing 
consumer redress, and crafting strategies and solutions that would bear 
fruit later. 
The AGs were not only an important stopgap, however. As Act II 
demonstrates, they were also vital partners on the front line. Against 
some of the deadly sins, such as mortgage rescue fraud, they were the 
primary enforcement agents. Even against the sins committed by large 
institutions that reached across the nation, the Enforcers and their state 
allies played an indispensable role. 
Clarity about the contribution these states made-why states 
matter-is important for two reasons. First, and looking backward, this 
story explains why Congress decided it was important to empower states 
and supports that decision. In Title X of the Dodd-Frank Act, Congress 
scaled back the preemption of state law,29s and created a dual 
enforcement regime whereby AGs could enforce federal laws that 
protect consumers in the financial marketplace.299 Second, and looking 
forward, this narrative counsels in favor of preserving these powers even 
when federal enforcements efforts are robust, and ensuring strong state 
consumer protection laws. 
So what do states bring to the table? Or stated differently, what do 
AGs contribute as sentries on the first and second lines of defense? 
Toward answering this question, I offer five hypotheses about the 
advantages of AG enforcement in the realm of consumer financial 
protection.3oo 
1. Information advantages. The states often have distinct 
information advantages because of their proximity to the harms and the 
type of laws they enforce, which facilitate more responsive enforcement. 
The AGs and their staff were far closer to the harms that were sweeping 
across middle-class America than any of the beltway regulators. The 
298 See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
299 See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
300 For general discussions about the quality of state enforcement, see Barkow, supra note 293, 
at 56-58; Jessica Bulman-Pozen & Heather K. Gerken, Essay, Uncooperative Federalism, 118 YALE 
L.J. 1256, 1284-91 (2009); Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 293, at 744-64; 
Rose, supra note 293, at 1371-75; Widman, supra note 293, at 209-14; Wilmarth, supra note 51, 
at 948-53. 
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states all have complaint-gathering systems,3o1 and every day their 
offices received first-hand accounts of the spreading disease. Sometimes 
people would walk right into their offices and share their stories. And 
because the states have both informal and formal mechanisms for 
sharing data, the AGs had a better sense than anyone-including the 
federal banking regulators-of the emerging epidemic at a local, 
regional, and national level. 
But their advantage was more than just proximity. It was also the 
types of laws they enforce.3oz Against each of the seven deadly sins, the 
states wielded one primary weapon: their consumer protection acts. 
These statutes are often called "UDAP" laws because many of them 
generally ban unfair and deceptive acts and practices. Although the 
Enforcers would sometimes evoke the common law or a particularized 
statute, their consumer protection acts supported the strongest civil 
claims against each of the seven deadly sins they confronted: predatory 
lending;3o3 discriminatory lending;3o4 mortgage fraud;3os mortgage 
rescue fraud;3o6 abuses in servicing and foreclosure;3o7 fraud in the 
creation, packaging, and sale of RMBS;3os and fraud by the credit rating 
agencies. 309 
Until recently, federal law protecting consumers of financial 
products and services was primarily disclosure-based.31o Statutes like the 
301 Prentiss Cox, Regulatory Perspectives & Initiatives: State Attorneys General Case Selection 
and Investigation, in 12TH ANNUAL CONSUMER FINANCIAL SERVICES LITIGATION INSTITUTE 86 
(Alan S. Kaplinsky ed., 2007). 
302 See generally Cox, supra note 79, at 301-03. 
303 See, e.g., Complaint, Iowa v. Household Int'l, supra note 74, at 1. 
304 See, e.g., Complaint, Commonwealth v. H&R Block, Inc., supra note 130, at 1. Note that 
Illinois Attorney General Lisa Madigan brought her suits against Wells Fargo and Countrywide 
under a specific fair lending law available in Illinois. See, e.g., Complaint, People v. Wells Fargo & 
Co., supra note 137, at 1. 
305 The majority of the mortgage fraud cases were criminal prosecutions, but the civil suits 
usually looked to the state consumer protection act. See, e.g., Press Release, N.Y. State Office of the 
Att'y Gen., Attorney General Targets Mortgage Fraud Ring (Nov. 29, 2006), available at 
http :I /www.ag.ny. gov I press-release/ attorney -general-targets-mortgage-fraud-ring. 
306 See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth of Mass., AG Coakley 
Targets Financial Companies for Predatory Loan Practices, Warns Homeowners About 
Foreclosure Relief Scams (Mar. 7, 2013), available at http://www.mass.gov/ago/news-and-
updates/press-releases/20 13/2013-03-07-imod-pinnacle.html. 
307 See, e.g., Complaint~~ 102-10, United States v. Bank of America Corp., No. 1:12-cv-00361-
RMC (D.D.C. Mar. 12, 2012), available at http:/ /www.justice.gov/opa/documents/complaint.pdf. 
308 See, e.g., Complaint~~ 24-25, People v. J.P. Morgan, No. 451556/2012 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 
1, 20 12), available at http:/ /www.ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/press-releases/20 12/jpm 
complaint.pdf. The New York complaint also contained a claim under the Martin Act. Id. ~~ 82-
83. 
309 See, e.g., Complaint, People v. McGraw-Hill Cos., supra note 292, at 1. 
310 See, e.g., Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial Protection: Stronger Agency and 
Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REv. 405 (2013). An important exception was the Home Ownership 
and Equity Protection Act of 1994 (HOEPA). Riegle Community Development and Regulatory 
Improvement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-325, §§ 151-158, 108 Stat. 2190, 2190-98 (codified as 
amended at 15 U.S. C.). This law gave the Federal Reserve power to regulate high-risk mortgages, 
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Truth in Lending Act, 311 for example, require lenders to provide certain 
information to borrowers about the terms of their products. Although 
they have the benefit of lower compliance costs, these laws alone proved 
inadequate to protect consumers.m Industry can run through a 
checklist and have reasonable confidence of conformity with the law. 
Enforcement is less costly for the same reason. The downside, however, 
is that disclosure-based regulation often does not take the regulator into 
the details of the alleged harm. 
By contrast, UDAP enforcement requires that the enforcer closely 
examine individual cases. The strongest UDAP laws create a broad 
standard prohibiting unfair and deceptive acts and practices. By their 
nature, standards force the regulator to dive into the details of a case: its 
facts and circumstances. With this understanding, the enforcer can then 
develop arguments as to why certain activities are unfair or deceptive. In 
addition to the advantages that follow proximity, this difference 
between disclosure-based regulation and laws that reach the substance 
of consumer transactions creates an information advantage for state 
AGs, who often have more extensive, timelier, and higher-quality 
information about emerging harms than federal regulators.m An 
exception that will become more important over time is CFPB and its 
power to enforce the new UDAAP-ban.314 Although FTC has always 
had the UDAP power in Section 5, resource and scope-of-authority 
limitations restricted the agency's influence.315 CFPB is less confined 
and has the broader UDAAP prohibition, which also bans "abusive" acts 
and practices. 316 But the agency also has resource limits and in some 
areas the states have jurisdiction that the new federal regulator lacks.m 
2. Agility. States will often have the ability to respond to emerging 
harms more swiftly than their federal counterparts because of the nature 
of their offices and the type of law they enforce. The first reason is 
straightforward: AGs have less bureaucracy. In the vast majority of 
states, the AG is a separately elected, constitutional officer and, 
therefore, does not report to any higher authority.318 Sprawling federal 
although the agency never exercised the power until after the subprime mortgage market had 
crashed. See ENGEL & McCoY, supra note 12, at 195-96; Wilmarth, supra note 51, at 899. 
311 Truth in Lending Act (TILA), Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as amended 
at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f(2006)). 
312 See Pridgen, supra note 310, at 417-20. 
313 For further discussion about the nature of UDAP enforcement, see Cox, supra note 79, at 
301-03. 
314 Dodd-Frank Act § 1036(a)(l)(B), 12 U.S.C. § 5536 (2012); see Totten, supra note 183, at 
131-36. 
315 See Williams & Bylsma, supra note 48, at 1243-49. 
316 See Totten, supra note 52, at 131-36. 
317 Id. at 171 n.361 and accompanying text. 
318 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 295, at 17-18. 
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regulators can have multiple layers of review that mean delay when 
states are nimble. 
Moreover, many state consumer protection acts are designed to 
give the enforcer agility. The Enforcers all had strong UDAPs,319 which 
offered three advantages.3zo The first advantage we have already 
explored: an ability to reach the substantive terms of the products and 
services they investigated. 321 Although some states expressly exempt 
application of their consumer protection acts to the credit industry, the 
Enforcers all had authority to reach the various actors involved in the 
subprime lending system. Second, the state UDAP laws also provided 
the Enforcers with a flexible standard to address evolving threats across 
the system. Some states prohibit only enumerated harms and deny their 
AG rulemaking powers, requiring the legislature to act each time a harm 
appears in some new form not already covered by the statute.322 The 
Enforcers, however, all enjoyed broad prohibitions on unfair and 
deceptive acts, providing them critical flexibility to act quickly against 
evolving harms. Moreover, three of the states granted their AGs 
rulemaking authority.m 
And third, the Enforcers had a menu of remedial options under 
their UDAP laws.324 The ability to recover on behalf of state consumers 
was especially advantageous. Many state UDAPs expressly empower 
their AG to seek restitution on behalf of consumers in their state,325 but 
even where the law is silent most AGs have standing under the common 
law doctrine of parens patriae.326 In some ways such cases are the 
319 See generally CAROLYN L. CARTER & JONATHAN SHELDON, UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS 
AND PRACTICES § 15.5 (7th ed. 2008); Christopher J. Willis & Stephanie H. Jackman, What Is an 
Attorneys' General Burden of Proof? Evidentiary Requirements in UDAP Actions Brought by State 
Attorneys General, 1789 PLI/CORP 1003 (2009), at 1026-54 (noting that California and Illinois 
have the two broadest state UDAP laws); Alan S. Brown & Larry E. Hepler, Comparison of 
Consumer Fraud Statutes Across the Fifty States, 55 FED'N. DEF. & CORP. COUNS. Q. 263 (2005), 
available at http:/ /www.thefederation.org/ documents/Vol55N o3.pdf. 
320 See generally Mark E. Budnitz, The Federalization and Privatization of Public Consumer 
Protection Law in the United States: Their Effect on Litigation and Enforcement, 24 GA. ST. U. L. 
REv. 663, 674-77 (2008); Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection 
Acts Really Little-FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REv. 163, 167-73 (2011); Victor E. Schwartz & Cary 
Silverman, Common-Sense Construction of Consumer Protection Acts, 54 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 15-32 
(2005). 
321 See supra notes 302-17 and accompanying text. 
322 See, e.g., Cow. REV. STAT§ 6-1-105 (2014); IND. CoDE§ 24-5-0.5-3 (2014). 
323 See CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 319, at 11. The AGs in Illinois, Iowa, and 
Massachusetts all had this power. See, e.g., Press Release, Office of the Att'y Gen., Commonwealth 
of Mass., Attorney General Martha Coakley Issues Final Mortgage Broker and Lender Regulations 
(Oct. 17, 2007) (on file with author). 
324 See Raymond H. Brescia, Tainted Loans: The Value of a Mass Torts Approach in Subprime 
Mortgage Litigation, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1, 13-23 (2009); Willis & Jackman, supra note 319, at 1005. 
325 CARTER & SHELDON, supra note 319. 
326 For background, see STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra 
note 295, at 102-04; Richard P. Ieyoub & Theodore Eisenberg, State Attorney General Actions, the 
Tobacco Litigation, and the Doctrine of Parens Patriae, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1859 (2000); Jack Ratliff, 
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functional equivalent of a private class action, but without many of the 
limitations that legislatures and courts have increasingly placed on the 
class action to restrict access.327 The relatively flat organizational 
structure of AG offices and the flexibility afforded by many UDAP laws 
give the states agility that federal regulators may lack. 
3. Remedial focus. State AGs embody a problem-solving approach 
that seeks consumer-driven injunctive relief and restitution. Interviewees 
at the center of the events discussed in Part II repeatedly reinforced that 
these remedies, rather than civil penalties, were the Enforcers' chief 
focus and concern throughout negotiation talks.3zs While AGs may have 
political incentives to seek large monetary payouts,329 here they 
demonstrated a commitment to crafting measurable assistance for 
effected consumers. 
The National Mortgage Settlement is the best example and reflects 
the evolving experience of a core group of attorneys working these cases 
for several years. Recall that the Countrywide settlement was the first 
time the states negotiated loan modifications for consumers into the 
terms of a settlement.33o Although this remedy later became a feature of 
the states' efforts, at the time it was uncommon. 331 The Countrywide 
case set an important precedent for later settlements, including the 
National Mortgage Settlement. Under that deal, the banks agreed to new 
servicing standards and about $20 billion in loan modifications and 
other consumer relief.m From one perspective, this remedy was 
surprising. The wrongdoing at issue was primarily procedural; a failure 
to properly foreclose under state foreclosure laws. Absent these failures 
of process, most of the foreclosures would have still likely occurred. The 
more typical remedy for procedural violations was a civil penalty. And 
yet the AGs converted these civil penalties into relief for homeowners, 
while also putting into place new rules governing the servicers moving 
forward. This commitment to consumer-focused relief is a hallmark of 
AG enforcement.333 
Parens Patriae: An Overview, 74 TUL. L. REv. 1847 (2000); Jim Ryan & Don R. Sampen, Suing on 
Behalf of the State: A Parens Patriae Primer, 86 ILL. B.J. 684 (1998). Although the common law 
doctrine has evolved over centuries, the most important modern case interpreting the bounds of 
the doctrine is Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 458 U.S. 592 (1982). 
327 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, supra note 293, at 488. 
328 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
329 See Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, supra note 293, at 517. 
330 See supra note 107 and accompanying text. 
331 Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
332 See supra notes 239-47 and accompanying text. 
333 But see Lemos, Aggregate Litigation Goes Public: Representative Suits by State Attorneys 
General, supra note 293, at 525-30 (arguing that AGs may have conflicting incentives that cause 
them to reach smaller settlements in parens patriae cases than the consumers they represent 
might otherwise recover). 
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4. Resistance to capture. When federal regulators are captured and 
fail to take necessary actions to protect consumers, at least a few states are 
likely to enter the enforcement gap. Moreover, because of the profound 
spillover effects that can accompany AG enforcement actions, even one 
leading state can protect consumers across the nation. 
No individual state AG is per se resistant to capture334-and a 
recent investigative report has documented the previously unrecognized 
influence of lobbying on the state AG world33s-but understood 
collectively it is likely that at least a few states will act. Resistance is a 
feature of the whole, not any one part. This hypothesis rests on the 
multiplicity of state actors: the fact that while we have one federal 
government, we have fifty state sovereigns whose AG offices have 
varying budgets, ideological commitments, and laws. In our federalist 
system, these diversities are strengths which can work to promote 
accountability and create a strong tendency for at least some states to 
act. 
The likelihood of AG action in the face of federal passivity depends 
upon at least four factors: authority, resources, ideology, and 
motivation. In some measure, a surplus in one area can make-up for 
deficiencies in other areas. The first two factors are relatively fixed and 
less interesting. They are prerequisites to action, but are not themselves 
anti-capture properties of the office. Although enterprising AGs can 
craft novel legal arguments, at some point they may lack the authority to 
act. State laws may be weak or preempted by federal law. Moreover, 
while AGs can concentrate resources in certain areas, and some AGs 
have worked with outside counsel on a set-fee or a contingency fee 
basis,336 a limited pot may preclude action in certain areas. Ideology 
matters and may forestall action even where the officeholder has the 
authority, resources, and political incentives to act. To the extent that 
consumer protection comes at a cost to industry, some AGs who favor 
industry may be disinclined to lead or even join multistate consumer 
protection cases. 
The most important factor, and the factor which in some cases can 
render the office of state AGs less susceptible to capture, is motivation. 
Certain incentives shape the office that are not present, at least to the 
same degree, among federal regulators. Moreover, forces that can 
capture federal regulators may be absent or diminished within the office 
334 See generally PAUL J. QUIRK, INDUSTRY INFLUENCE IN FEDERAL REGULATORY AGENCIES 
(1981); Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 
COLUM. L. REv. 1260, 1284-92 (2006); Barkow, supra note 293, at 21-24. 
335 Eric Lipton, Lobbyists, Bearing Gifts, Pursue Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2014, 
at Al. 
336 See David A. Dana, Public Interest and Private Lawyers: Toward a Normative Evaluation of 
Parens Patriae Litigation by Contingency Fee, 51 DEPAUL L. REv. 315,315 (2001). 
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of the state AG. This environment shapes the motivations of AGs and 
the actions they bring. 
In forty-three states the AG is popularly elected.m The vast 
majority of state AGs, therefore, share the same political incentives that 
influence other elected offices: the desire to satisfy certain 
constituencies, please past or future campaign contributors, and grab 
headlines to augment one's reputation, among other motivations. These 
incentives also have liabilities-the possibility of over-enforcement, for 
example-but my focus now is the way in which these incentives can 
make state AGs an effective counterbalance to a captured federal 
regulator,33s Although AGs have other outlets, their primary means of 
action is enforcement of the law. And so for AGs with the authority, 
resources, and ideological alignment, the motivation to bring an 
enforcement action against an entity that federal regulators have refused 
to regulate may be exceedingly strong. Those are the moments that 
forge reputations-and political careers. 
At the same time, some AGs may escape some of the forces that 
capture federal regulators. No elected official is immune from lobbying, 
and yet different actors in different states attract different lobbyists. In 
Act I of the story, the financial institutions' lobby wielded tremendous 
influence over OCC and OTS, in part because of defects in agency 
design.339 Those same forces may bear less influence against at least 
some AG offices.34o If the states are not empowered, either because of 
preemption or because of weak laws, motivation will be of little value. 
But where these four factors align, states have the potential to step into 
the gap left by federal regulators who fail to act. 
Moreover, the actions of even a single AG can have profound 
spillover effects if other states follow. The multistate action against 
Countrywide eventually included forty-two states, but it began with the 
investigations of California and Illinois.341 While a single state cannot 
wield the influence of a federal regulator, a single state joined by several 
dozen other states can have significant impact. And the fact that a state 
may choose not to lead because of deficiencies in any of the four 
abovementioned areas does not mean that state will refuse to join the 
settlement. Even AGs who refuse to lead for political or ideological 
reasons may take the money when all that is required is a signature. 
337 See STATE ATTORNEYS GENERAL: POWER AND RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 295, at 17. The 
Governor appoints the AG in Alaska, Hawaii, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Wyoming. In 
Maine, the state legislature selects the AG by secret ballot. And in Tennessee, the state supreme 
court appoints the AG. 
338 See, e.g., Lemos, State Enforcement of Federal Law, supra note 293, at 759-64. 
339 See Bar-Gill & Warren, supra note 51, at 86-95; Wilmarth, supra note 51, at Part I. 
340 See, e.g., Telephone Interview with Patrick Madigan, supra note 176. 
341 See supra note 100 and accompanying text. 
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The story of the Enforcers gives credence to this hypothesis about 
why at least some AGs act when their federal counterparts are captured. 
Although the multistate coalitions in Act I included states from across 
the political spectrum, it is not surprising that the leading states 
identified with the President's opposing party. Other factors were at 
work, but the opportunity to make a mark by stepping-in where the 
President had failed is strong motivation to act. And while the banking 
lobby had strong ties inside the beltway, its influence in state AG offices 
maybe less. 
5. Entrepreneurialism. Lastly, the states can create, test, and refine 
new enforcement strategies and remedies that larger state coalitions or the 
federal government can later borrow and scale. The multiplicity of states 
permits broad experimentation as one state or a group of states focus 
their limited resources on specific harms. For the majority of AGs who 
are elected, innovation may carry political rewards as a reputation-
building tool.342 Innovation can take at least two forms: the crafting of 
new enforcement strategies that reach new targets or reach existing 
targets under new theories; and the crafting of new remedies that help 
consumers and stop future harm. Moreover, the efforts of even one state 
can have national effect as a coalition of states or the federal government 
bring these ideas to scale. 
The story of the Enforcers in Part II exhibits this 
entrepreneurialism. At several moments the states crafted new 
enforcement strategies that the federal government later borrowed. 
Perhaps the best example is Attorney General Martha Coakley's 
decision at the start of her term in 2007 to devote considerable resources 
to investigate and bring enforcement actions against firms that 
committed fraud in the securitization process.343 This decision came at a 
cost; even the most well-funded AG's office faces considerable 
constraints and focusing on one harm means little or no resources for 
other harms. Massachusetts, for example, did not bring actions against 
the credit ratings agencies for their misrepresentations about toxic 
RMBSs through 2007, and the state's absence may have been the 
consequence of focusing on the investment banks. Yet Coakley's 
decision proved enormously beneficial well beyond state borders. Her 
office crafted the legal theories for liability under the state consumer 
protection act, making Massachusetts the first state to hold the 
investment banks accountable and the only state to systematically bring 
actions throughout the subprime financing industry.344 Most important, 
342 Adam J. Levitin, Hydraulic Regulation: Regulating Credit Markets Upstream, 26 YALE J. ON 
REG. 143, 199-200 (2009); see also Colin L. Provost, State Attorneys General, Entrepreneurship, 
and Consumer Protection in the New Federalism, 33 PUBLIUS 37 (2003). 
343 See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text. 
344 See supra notes 254-65 and accompanying text. 
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Coakley's efforts that began in 2007 created the template for actions 
brought by the federal government several years later through the RMBS 
Working Group, including the $13 billion settlement against J.P. 
Morgan in late 2013.345 
Illinois AG Lisa Madigan played a similar role. Following 
Connecticut, Illinois was one of the earliest to investigate and file suit 
against Standard and Poor's, the credit rating agency that was giving 
AAA ratings to toxic mortgage securities up to the collapse of the 
subprime market.346 After surviving a motion to dismiss in November 
2012 that raised substantial constitutional arguments regarding free 
speech and federal preemption, other states and the Department of 
Justice followed suit in early 2013.347 Madigan played a similar role in 
bringing discriminatory lending cases against Countrywide and Wells 
Fargo, with the Department of Justice later joining. The states have the 
potential to serve as a testing ground and persuade other actors who 
may be more hesitant to act. As elected officials, AGs are well-
positioned to serve this role because political incentives can foster a 
willingness to take risks that appointed bureaucrats and their civil 
service ranks may lack.34s 
The states were also innovating on the remedy side in ways that 
trickled up and shaped national policy. The best example is the 
mortgage servicing standards which became the exemplar for later 
federal rule making. The standards that came out of the National 
Mortgage Settlement were only binding on the five servicers that were 
party to the agreement, but because they represented about fifty-five 
percent of the servicing market, the standards were effectively 
national.349 Two months after settlement, CFPB announced it would 
issue rules governing mortgage servicing,35o which became final in 
January 2013.351 As several commentators observed, the new rules drew 
heavily on the servicing standards. 352 Not only are governors and state 
legislatures at work in the laboratories of democracy-AGs are as well. 
345 See supra notes 266-79 and accompanying text. 
346 See supra notes 286-87 and accompanying text. 
347 See supra notes 288-92 and accompanying text; see also Press Release, Ill. Att'y Gen., 
Madigan: U.S. DOJ & 14 States Join In Litigation Against Standard & Poor's (Feb. 5, 2013), 
available at http:/ /illinoisattorneygeneral.gov/pressroom/20 13 _02/20 130205.html. 
348 See Provost, supra note 342. 
349 See Bostrom et al., supra note 240, at 133. 
350 Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Outlines Borrower-Friendly Approach to 
Mortgage Servicing (Apr. 9, 2012), available at http://www.consumerfinance.gov/newsroom/ 
consumer-financial-protection-bureau -outlines-borrower-friendly -approach-to-mortgage-
servicing. 
351 Truth in Lending (Regulation Z), 77 Fed. Reg. 69,738 (Nov. 21, 2012) (to be codified at 12 
C.P.R. pt. 1026); Mortgage Servicing Rules Under the Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act 
(Regulation X), 78 Fed. Reg. 10,696 (Feb. 14, 2013) (to be codified at 12 C.P.R. pt. 1024). 
352 See, e.g., J.C. Boggs, CFPB Amends Rules Governing Mortgages and Mortgage Servicers, 
KING & SPALDING WASHINGTON INSIGHT (Jan. 23, 2013), http://www.kslaw.com/library/ 
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B. How Governments Partner 
The story of the Enforcers not only suggests why states matter in 
the realm of consumer financial protection, but also how states might 
partner with each other and the federal government to achieve their 
goals. The multistate actions that formed the plotline in Act I raise 
interesting questions about the conditions and forms of collaboration 
among states. But the most important contribution of this story to the 
challenge of how governments work together to enforce the law comes 
in Act II with the National Mortgage Settlement and the new model of 
multigovernment, multi-agency actions in the field of consumer 
protection. 
For several decades now, and certainly since the tobacco litigation 
in the mid -1990s, the multistate action has been a regular feature of the 
public enforcement landscape in the area of consumer protection. 
Although the response to the servicing debacle at first took the shape of 
a traditional multistate action, within a few months it had transformed 
into what is better called a multigovernment action. The mere fact of 
state-federal partnership in consumer protection cases was not new. The 
FTC, for example, has a rich history of cooperating with the states.3s3 
And limited state-federal partnerships have existed in the related field of 
antitrust enforcement for several decades.3s4 But the coalition on the 
servicing case was unprecedented for the breadth of its scope: all fifty 
states and multiple federal agencies.3ss 
The advantages of this enforcement vehicle against certain harms 
are several. Most apparent, the multigovernment, multiagency action 
aggregates strengths. The states bring to the table the benefits previously 
described. The federal actors bring additional authority under federal 
law; in some cases expanded jurisdiction; additional manpower; 
specialized resources such as economists and forensic accountants, 
which states often lack; and the increased leverage that shadows federal 
involvement. 
Less apparent is the possibility for the multigovernment, 
multiagency action to mitigate the potential costs of forward-looking 
remedies. As mentioned earlier, AGs often understand their role as 
problem-solvers who are not just compensating victims, but also 
preventing future harms. Consequently, AGs have historically placed 
considerable focus on crafting injunctive remedies meant to reform 
newsletters/Washingtonlnsight/2013/Jan23/article8.html; Elizabeth L. McKeen et al., CFPB Issues 
New Mortgage Servicing Regulations, O'MELVENY & MYERS LLP (Sept. 5, 2012), 
http:/ /www.omm.com/ cfp b-issues-new-mortgage-servicing-regulations-09-05-2012. 
353 See, e.g., HUDSON, supra note 47 and accompanying text. 
354 See antitrust sources cited infra note 370. 
355 See supra notes 219-20 and accompanying text. 
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broken systems. While this approach has benefits, especially where 
federal regulators are captured, it also bears certain costs. The casebook 
example of "regulation by litigation" is the 1998 tobacco settlement.3s6 
These fears are well founded and the costs potentially high.3s7 
Nonetheless, context matters and nearly all accounts fail to seriously 
consider crisis situations such as what the states encountered this past 
decade.3ss And more importantly as I explain below, the 
multigovernment, multiagency model has the potential to mitigate 
several of these costs. 
Critics raise several concerns. At the top of the list is a concern 
about democratic accountability.3s9 Settlement talks are done in private 
and, unlike the legislative process or notice-and-comment rulemaking, 
affected parties may have no voice in the process. This approach can 
lead to inefficient outcomes as legitimate concerns are overlooked. 
Critics also raise concerns about the absence of systematic and expert 
evaluation.36o In the agency context, expert administrators can have a 
synoptic perspective and take account of the consequences of any 
regulatory choice for other parts of a system and thereby increase 
efficiency. Litigation, by contrast, is piecemeal. And lastly, prospective 
relief backed by a consent decree may restrict future flexibility for 
reform.361 
These concerns are valid and the Enforcers did not fully escape 
them. New York AG Cuomo's settlement with Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac on the heels of his investigation of the appraisal management firm, 
eAppraiseiT, is an example.362 The multigovernment approach in the 
National Mortgage Settlement, however, mitigated several of these costs. 
The size of the coalition-fifty-one sovereign governments-meant 
internal dissent that provided an outlet for opposing views. For 
example, a group of states led by Virginia AG Kenneth T. Cuccinelli 
lobbied against principal reductions.363 More important, the presence of 
356 See generally MARTHA DERTHICK, UP IN SMOKE: FROM LEGISLATION TO LITIGATION IN 
TOBACCO POLITICS (2d ed. 2005); ANDREW P. MORRISS ET AL., REGULATION BY LITIGATION 
(2009); REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION (W. Kip Viscusi ed., 2002); Donald G. Gifford, 
Impersonating the Legislature: State Attorneys General and Parens Patriae Product Litigation, 49 
B.C. L. REV. 913 (2008); Timothy Meyer, Comment, Federalism and Accountability: State 
Attorneys General, Regulatory Litigation, and the New Federalism, 95 CALIF. L. REv. 885 (2007); 
Lynch, supra note 2. 
357 See infra notes 359-61 and accompanying text. 
358 See, e.g., MORRISSET AL., supra note 356, at 170-71. 
359 See id.; REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 356, at 3; Meyer, supra note 356, at 
909-14. 
360 See REGULATION THROUGH LITIGATION, supra note 356, at 2, 10; Gifford, supra note 356, 
at 920. 
361 See Meyer, supra note 356, at 912. 
362 See supra notes 111-16 and accompanying text. 
363 David Streitfeld, In Foreclosure Settlement Talks with Banks, Predictions of a Long Process, 
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,2011, at B11. 
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multiple federal agencies prevented the states from pursuing reform 
goals at odds with the federal regulators. In addition to the Department 
of Justice, other federal participants included the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development, the Department of Treasury, CFPB, 
the Federal Reserve, OCC, and FDIC,364 Although the federal banking 
regulators eventually reached a separate agreement, 365 they remained a 
voice at the table as the group crafted new mortgage servicing standards. 
And beyond government and industry actors, the advocacy community 
found several AGs responsive to their concerns.366 This path did not 
carry all the safeguards for democratic accountability that adhere within 
the legislative or agency rulemaking processes, and yet it demonstrated a 
remarkable level of participation. 
Moreover, rather than posing a roadblock to future reform, the 
servicing standards that came out of the settlement provided a template 
for later rulemaking. Two months after settlement, CFPB announced it 
would issue rules governing mortgage servicing,367 which became final 
in January 2013.368 As earlier mentioned, the new rules looked to the 
servicing standards coming out of the national settlement. The 
multigovernment approach facilitated this outcome.369 
IV. THE REST OF THE STORY 
The Enforcers and their other state allies played a critical role 
before, during, and after the Great Recession for many reasons, but one 
reason was essential: they collaborated. Absent coordination, the states 
could have never exercised this influence. Of the eighteen cases that 
form the narrative in Part II, fifteen were either collaborative from 
inception or planted the seeds for such suits later. These actions allow 
individual states to overcome constraints that might otherwise prevent 
action, including a lack of authority, resource constraints, and 
ideological and political obstacles. 
Nonetheless, the role of multistate and multigovernment actions 
remains understudied. Some scholars have approached the subject from 
a theoretical perspective,370 but the field lacks robust empirical study.m 
364 See Press Release, $25 Billion Agreement, supra note 239. 
365 See supra notes 235-38. 
366 See, e.g., Brady & ElBoghdady, supra note 229. 
367 See supra note 350. 
368 See supra note 351. 
369 Further reforms to the settlement process could further mitigate costs. For example, courts 
might publicize a proposed settlement, invite responses, and perhaps require the parties to 
respond to the concerns raised prior to judicial approval. See MORRISS ET AL., supra note 356, at 
172-73. 
370 See Cornell W. Clayton, Law, Politics and the New Federalism: State Attorneys General as 
National Policymakers, 56 REV. POL. 525 (1994), available at http://www.jstor.org/stable/1407967; 
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Moreover, the literature is often focused on the tobacco litigation, which 
is historically important, but may distort more general conclusions 
given the idiosyncratic features of that settlement. 
The narrative in Part II suggests several further questions ripe for 
empirical investigation. These questions fall into four distinct areas: 
leadership; authority; collaboration; and remedies. The story shows that 
leadership matters. While many states may participate, absent 
leadership these actions may never begin. Which states and which AGs 
are leading? Why are they leading? And furthermore, what are the 
rewards of leading? Are there financial rewards for the state, beyond 
perceived electoral advantages that might accrue with leadership?m 
The story of the Enforcers also suggests that state UDAP laws are a 
highly important weapon for AGs, at least in the area of consumer 
financial protection. A second set of questions considers authority. By 
introducing the source of law as a variable, what do we learn? In 
particular, what effect does UDAP strength have on leadership and 
participation in these cases? Do states with weak UDAP laws participate 
less? Or does participation in multistate or multigovernment actions 
overcome weaknesses in state law? 
Future empirical research should also focus on multigovernment 
cases. When are the states collaborating with the federal government? 
Which federal agencies are collaborating? Do certain types of cases 
more often lead to collaboration? 
And a final area of questioning concerns remedies. In responding 
to the financial crisis, the states typically sought three types of relief: civil 
penalties, consumer restitution, and in some cases injunctive relief. How 
often are the states pursuing these various forms of relief? Under what 
DeBow, supra note 2; Krauss, supra note 2; Meyer, supra note 356; William H. Pryor Jr., A 
Comparison of Abuses and Reforms of Class Actions and Multigovernment Lawsuits, 74 TuL. L. 
REv. 1885 (2000); Lynch, supra note 2. Scholars have also looked at multigovernment actions in 
the antitrust context; see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Federalism and the Enforcement of Antitrust 
Laws by State Attorneys General, in COMPETITION LAWS IN CONFLICT: ANTITRUST JuRISDICTION 
IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 252 (Richard A. Epstein & Michael S. Greve eds., 2004); Stephen 
Calkins, Perspectives on State and Federal Antitrust Enforcement, 53 DUKE L.J. 673 (2003); Harry 
First, Delivering Remedies: The Role of the States in Antitrust Enforcement, 69 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 
1004 (2001); Michael S. Greve, Cartel Federalism? Antitrust Enforcement by State Attorneys 
General, 72 U. CHI. L. REv. 99 (2005). 
371 Two studies are strictly focused on the tobacco litigation: Thomas A. Schmeling, Stag 
Hunting with the State AG: Anti-Tobacco Litigation and the Emergence of Cooperation Among 
State Attorneys General, 25 LAW & POL'Y 429 (2003), and Rorie L. Spill et al., Taking on Tobacco: 
Policy Entrepreneurship and the Tobacco Litigation, 54 PoL. REs. Q. 605 (2001). Apart from these 
case-specific studies, Colin Provost has produced the only broad empirical research on the role of 
states in multigovernment actions. See Colin L. Provost, An Integrated Model of U.S. State AG 
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conditions? And how often does injunctive relief stimulate later 
regulation rather than stifling it? Answering these questions is critical to 
understanding the rest of the story. 
CONCLUSION 
In the years before, during, and after the Great Recession, the 
Enforcers and their state partners spearheaded actions against the worst 
abuses in the residential mortgage lending industry. The states might 
have played a secondary role. Their primary means of enforcement, the 
lawsuit, was a blunt tool compared to the precision instruments 
available to federal regulators: rulemaking and the power to supervise 
and examine depositories. Moreover, the contamination had national 
reach, demanding a national response. But in the years leading up to the 
crisis the federal government did not act and the states rightly stepped 
in to treat the wounded and stanch the spreading disease. That the states 
acted is testimony to the vitality of our federalist system. That the states 
will have to play this role at some point in the future is certain. At a 
minimum, the states served as a second line of defense. But even after 
the federal government joined their efforts, the Enforcers continued to 
lead. This story suggests that states play an important role on both the 
first and second lines of defense, while also modeling a new form of 
state-federal collaboration. 
